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A Performance Perspective to Sport Philosophy

by

Dennis Ray Nighswonger ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Faculty of Physical Education and Recreation

Edmonton, Alberta

Fall 1995

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

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled A Performance Perspective to Sport Philosophy submitted by Dennis Ray Nighswonger in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Dr. Debra Shogan

Dr. Harvey Scott

Dr. Marsha Padfield

Dr. Gerry Glassford

Professor C. T. Peacocke

Dr. Earle F. Zeigler

Date: Sept 28, 1995

Abstract

This study addresses the philosophical study of sport via a performance perspective toward identifying an organizational format for problem identification and investigation in the philosophical study of sport. A thesis about sport performance emerges from literature analysis and synthesis such that the negative aspects of the professional domain of physical activity are claimed to be the result of the application of inappropriate principles of practice which are derived from faulty or misinformed philosophical choices. Practice is based on principles and principles are derived from alternative views on some central philosophical problems. There are some primary philosophical questions which require a position prior to engaging in any action, particularly professional practice. There are some additional philosophical problems of special concern to the domain of sport performance which also have the same requirement. These positions cannot be established in any way other than choice-philosophical choice. Philosophical study of sport as performance can provide a means of discovering and articulating appropriate justification for professional practice by exposing problems involved in making choices among available alternative positions. A further consequence of philosophical mistakes applied to professional practice and sport performance is portrayal, or representation, of a faulty, or at least incomplete, image of human excellence. Considering only two alternatives is recognized as a major limitation for decision-making. However, identification and examination of what appear to be major alternatives for each problem area may expose the source of practical problems in uninformed or misinformed philosophical choice. Problems are initially derived from the four major taxonomic categories of

philosophic inquiry including being, knowledge, values, and logic. Additional problems of particular concern to the professional domain are also addressed as practice via technology and excellence as representation.

Preface

Sports and games have been a very pervasive and significant part of my life. There is then, an experiential basis for this project. I am not an isolated external observer. Nor is this study intended as merely an academic exercise. The topics analyzed and discussed have personal meaning and practical significance. My philosophical project began several years ago as an attempt to 'take on' some philosophical questions strictly for my own benefit. This has expanded over the years into attempts to make opportunities available for others with similar interests. Further, that effort has expanded into attempts to convince others in the professional domain that such inquiry is not only personally useful but professionally important. The process has been and continues to be a fulfilling experience. There may be many ways to express the gratification of intellectual accomplishment. For my purpose the words of John Locke seem most appropriate to both the subject matter and the philosophical enterprise:

> He that hawks at larks and sparrow has no less sport, though a much less considerable quarry, than he that flies at nobler game; and he is little acquainted with the subject of this treatise, the understanding, who does not know that, as it is the most elevated faculty of the soul, so it is employed with a greater and more constant delight than any of the other. Its searches after truth are a sort of hawking and hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the pleasure.[1]

---

[1]Locke, John An Essay Concrning Human Understanding, 39th Edition., London: William Tegg & Co., 1875, P. ix.

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CHAPTER 1

THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHY: ACTION

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this project is to address the philosophical study of sport via a concept which ostensibly is of major concern to both the discipline and practice of sport and other movement professionals--performance. That is, 'performance' is the 'doorway' through which I have attempted to identify an organizational format for problem identification in the philosophical study of sport. Although a thesis about sport performance emerges from literature analysis and synthesis, there is a broader attempt to provide an answer to the three basic questions of inquiry 'what', 'why', and 'how', applied to the philosophical study of sport. At the end of this study, the reader should have acquired a sense of what philosophy itself and applied to sport consists of, why such studies should be done, and a means of organizing such studies including some basic and potential problem areas.

It is my contention that the negative aspects of the professional domain of physical activity are the result of an application of inappropriate principles of practice which are derived from faulty or misinformed philosophical choices. Consequently, dominant ideas about performance which are expressed and applied in the physical activity domain, especially through sport, are not as comprehensive as presentation might suggest nor are they necessarily the best or the most appropriate.

This study is based on the claim that practice is based on principles and

principles are derived from alternative views on some central philosophical problems. That is, there are some philosophical questions which require a position prior to engaging in any action, particularly professional practice. There are some additional philosophical problems of special concern to the domain of sport performance which also have the same requirement. These positions cannot be established in any way other than by making a philosophical choice. Philosophical study of sport as performance can provide a means of discovering and articulating appropriate justification for professional practice by exposing problems involved in making choices among available alternative positions. My contention is that philosophical mistakes applied to professional practice and sport performance often emanate from a faulty, or at least incomplete, image of human excellence.

1.2 The Problem of Action

Action is what organisms do. Action is commonly understood as movement, which is empirically perceivable. However, a more informed view of human action includes thought as an activity. Human organisms think as well as move. Many claim that thinking is the distinguishing feature between 'humans' and the so-called lower animals.

A study of human performance must include all aspects of human action, including thinking, even in the study of sport. If thinking is part of what it means to be human, then attention must be given to inclusion of the study and application of thinking skills in any study of human endeavor.

Philosophy is the traditional designation for the process of thinking. As such, philosophy is applicable to the study of human movement. The problem of action can best be described as determining the relation between philosophy and the study of sport and human movement. It remains for me to delineate a more specific task for the application of philosophy in this regard.

1.3 The Contribution of Philosophy

One of the goals of this study is to contribute to a broader application of philosophy, not only to sport and physical education, but also to a more comprehensive perception of the professional domain of human movement activities. In order to achieve this goal, the nature of philosophy and its application, and potential contribution to human movement activities needs to be clarified here. Although the nature of philosophy has been described in many texts, definitions still vary. However, there does seem to be some agreement as to essential aspects of philosophy. Reiteration of some main points here will be useful to help clarify both the purpose of philosophic inquiry and the method by which that purpose is achieved.

Philosophy consists of the process of inquiry--asking questions about things in a particular way. Philosophy is process rather than a defined body of knowledge even though a body of knowledge or thought on particular questions has accumulated over the centuries. Traditional philosophy concentrates on basic questions of being, knowledge, and values. Although there may be some debate as to the nature and application of philosophy, the root of all philosophical

inquiry may be traced to one or more of these basic categories of questions. The way we understand and order our experience may be understood in terms of logic; the way we think things go together. As part of that logic we make assumptions, or choices, about questions of being, knowledge, and values. One basic contribution of philosophy is that of questioning and clarifying such assumptions so that the subsequent logic used to interpret and order experience makes sense, or has a sound foundation.

Philosophy can help organize thinking about the ways we interpret experience of performance. One might anticipate that this thinking would be an important aspect of personal, professional, and social experience in human movement activities. However, thinking about performance and interpretation of such experience does not appear to be particularly well organized, especially in the physical activity domain. Philosophic inquiry is central to pursuing an understanding of sport performance. I will also argue that philosophy should be an integral part of the study of performance in the physical activity professional domain.

An appropriate and comprehensive philosophy of sport performance may be developed and understood by reference to those basic philosophic questions noted before as being, knowledge, and value. By focusing on these questions, it is also possible to demonstrate at least the potential for an organized format for problem identification in the philosophy of sport.

Most would agree that development of mental properties and characteristics, beyond basic necessary biological conditions for survival, requires

intentional effort and focused attention. For example, Shogan[1] points out the need for special attention in learning of moral characteristics in sport. I would suggest that the same kind of special attention is also required for understanding of other aspects of the sport context.

Adler[2] uses the term 'sloth' in failure to attend to intellectual development and designates implying that we have a moral obligation to pursue both physical and mental, or intellectual, excellence. This is a particularly relevant consideration for a profession which has a history of dualistic admonishment of 'sound mind-sound body'.

It may be that one of the major contributions philosophy can make to the study of play games, sports and the human movement domain generally, is that of re-establishing the practical connection, or understanding thereof, between contemporary formal studies and common sense experience. As Zeigler[3] suggests, this involves improving the everyday perception of physical education which is held by most people, including some practicing professionals. Providing opportunity for development and application of philosophical thinking skills would enhance the general understanding of human movement which results from the everyday experience people have with human movement. Reflective or critical thinking may contribute to correcting errors which occur in everyday

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[1]Shogan, Debra "Moral Development of Young People Through Sport: Is It An Attainable Goal?," in Galasso, P.J.(Ed.) Philosophy of Sport and Physical Activity, Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1988, Pp. 319-323.
[2]Adler, Mortimer J. Intellect: Mind over Matter, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990, P. 186.
[3]Zeigler, E. F. An Introduction to Sport and Physical Education Philosophy, Dubuque: Brown & Benchmark, 1989, Pp. xviii-xxi.

thinking about human movement. In addition, a major task of professional philosophers in this area may be that of asserting, or re-asserting, both the development of and use of intellectual capacities so that the gap between formal academic studies and common sense experience becomes as narrow as we can possibly, and reasonably, make it. Adler addresses the question of contribution of philosophy in the following way:

> what would be most worthy of the philosopher: to do the work of inquiry, analysis, and demonstration which seeks to learn the truth, or to transcend work and enjoy the rest of contemplating truths already learned?[4]

As Adler suggests, possession of the truth is decidedly preferable. However, the process and the product are so interconnected that they cannot be separated. That is, one cannot transcend the work of philosophy as that work never ceases for those engaged in it. As he says further:

> The same sort of work--the work of analyzing, arguing, proving--is needed to sustain the truth in our minds as is needed for its original acquisition.[5]

So, it seems that the problem of doing philosophy is, in itself, a persistent problem. The focus of work derived from this problem involves both doing the work and helping others acquire needed skills to continue the work.

Two objectives may be derived from the contribution of philosophy to the study of sport and human movement. These objectives are demonstrative and facilitative. The demonstrative objective may be achieved by engaging in

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[4]Adler, M.J. "The Philosopher," in Heywood, R.B.(Ed.) The Works of the Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966(c1946), P. 216.
[5]Adler, M.J. "The Philosopher," in Heywood, R.B.(Ed.) The Works of the Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966(c1946), P. 216.

analyzing, arguing, and proving applied to specifically identified philosophical problems within the professional domain. The facilitative objective may be achieved by providing curriculum opportunities for exposure to topical literature available and acquisition of intellectual skills required to engage in this kind of work.

I believe that these objectives for the contribution of philosophy to the study of sport and human movement are realistic and achievable. Good philosophical work can be done by professional practitioners and professional academics. As professional academics we can help others in the discipline and practice, who may not have the time, inclination, or training in philosophy, discover ways and means to explore alternative views, make informed choices about those views, and develop skills in articulation of those views. This is not only a useful future for philosophy in the professional domain of sport, physical activity, and human movement, but also an essential one because of the relation between ideas and practice--a relationship which I clarify later in this chapter.

The proposed task of philosophy in the study of sport performance is in response to the three basic questions of inquiry; what, why, and how.

What: The Task of Philosophy

The task of philosophy in relation to the study of physical education, sport, games, and human movement activities has been described in several ways.

In 1969, Paul Weiss offered this account of the task of philosophy of sport.

> A philosophical account of sport can have no practical value beyond that of making one aware of basic distinctions, final boundaries unnoticed connections, and neglected possibilities, and the place that sport has in the life of man. This, though, should be sufficient to make a theoretical, speculative study of some interest, even to those whose main stress is on the practical, the technical, and the immediate.[6]

The account given by Weiss is surprising even for a philosopher. This view supports a common perception that philosophy is a non-practical activity. Yet, if philosophy is understood as a process of interpreting personal experience, simply trying to make sense of the world and our place in it is applicable to everything we do, sport included. Perhaps, this is especially true of sport given the pervasive occurrence of sport and interest in it.

Robert L. Simon added this account in 1985.

> ...the task of philosophy of sport would be to clarify, systematize, and evaluate the principles we believe should govern the world of sport.[7]

This account by Simon recognizes that philosophy not only can be but is applied to sport through principles which govern the world of sport. This appears initially to be a sociological view not applicable to intentional human action, that is, to individual acting agents. However, this view does involve recognition that there is, or should be, a coherent 'logic' of the discipline and subsequent practice for the world of sport.

Earle F. Zeigler proposed the following account in 1989.

> Philosophy will help the sport and physical educational

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[6]Weiss, Paul Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969, P. 10.
[7]Simon, Robert L. Sports and Social Values, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985, P. 4.

> professional...to fashion for himself or herself a mental image of what sport and physical education ought to be in the light of a personal philosophy of developmental physical activity with a life pattern.[8]

Zeigler adds individual action to professional action by placing the foundation for views in one's personal philosophy. One's personal philosophy is said to provide the basis for one's professional views. This view also appears to have a more ethical orientation by the specific use of the term 'ought'.

My own position which serves as the basis of this project may be summarized as follows:

> The major task of philosophic inquiry in the physical activity professional domain is the exploration, development and articulation of a comprehensive philosophy of action in relation to one's professional activities.

I reject Weiss's account of non-applicability and accept Simon's task of clarification and analysis of principles. Zeigler's placement of inquiry with the individual is also accepted. However, I add two notes. The task of philosophy is not static but an ongoing, persistent problem, as previously mentioned. Further, application of well developed thinking skills in sport and other areas of life is more important for making any particular action decision than to analyzing any given principle. Principles may be said to constitute some degree of consensus among professionals for practice in any given field. Therefore, attention to principles is useful to expose the individual action decisions which make up that consensus. Yet, even here, individuals in action produce those principles.

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[8]Zeigler, Earle F. Sport and Physical Education Philosophy, Dubuque: Brown & Benchmark, 1989, P. xx-xxi.

It may be claimed that philosophy cannot contribute to academic studies in professional preparation programs where students have insufficient experience to be subjected to the evaluative, interpretive process of philosophy. I suggest that since nearly everyone has some experience with play, games, and some sports by the usual age of college entrance, students of professional preparation programs in human movement activities are among the most experienced in related professional activities. That is, physical activity and sport students have more experience in competitive and recreational situations involving physical activity, sports, and games than, say, corresponding students in business programs have experience in business management activities.

Why: Ideas to Practice

There is a link between ideas explored philosophically and personal and professional practice in the sport context. The sequence of ideas and action is not the same in everyday learning as it is in professional practice. Exploring the link between philosophy and professional practice is proposed for three main reasons. First, human performance, whatever conceptualization is used, is known and understood as action--what people do. Individual persons, actors are engaged in the doing. Therefore, we need to understand our ideas about people--the actors-- in order to better understand our ideas about human performance. Second, understanding our ideas about people in action is more important for those engaged in professional activities, or roles, which claim to aim for the enhancement of human performance in order to ensure success and, perhaps

more importantly, to justify interventive activity and professional practices. Third, this kind of understanding and justification does not appear to have been done very well in the professional history of sport and human movement.

Unless one is strictly a behavioral creature, one's ideas do provide the basis for action at least at some level of involvement in the world. If we can accept that most people do intentionally make choices about what they do, it follows that goal-orientation, at some level, is involved in one's actions. Developing strategies for goal pursuit necessarily involves possession of some basic knowledge or belief about the world and how things work. To say that one's ideas and actions can be separated is, in my view, a mistake. In a commentary on the problem of ethical relativism, W.T. Stace notes the implications of ideas for practical conduct as he says:

> It is true that, for a time, it may be possible to hold one view in theory and to act practically upon another. But ideas, even philosophical ideas, are not so ineffectual that they can remain for ever idle in the upper chambers of the intellect. In the end they seep down to the level of practice. They get themselves acted on...[9]

If the relation between ideas and action is accepted in a personal sense, then it would also seem reasonable to say that the same occurs in one's professional actions given the commonality of professional persons, roles, and actions. As a problem of action, the basic questions and problems of philosophy are dealt with in the practices of the professional domain. Positions are, in fact,

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[9]Stace, W.T. "Absolutism and Relativism in Ethics," in Stumpf, S. E.(Ed.) Philosophy: History and Problems, Fifth Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994, Pp. 732-740. (Reprinted from The Concept of Morals, New York: Macmillan, 1937).

taken on basic philosophical questions including those of being, knowledge, and value. These problems are not solved for all time, but solutions proposed serve, in part, as the foundation for principles of practice as guides for action. There is, however, no necessary connection between solutions proposed and reality. Nor are those solutions used necessarily the best available. That is, there are always alternative solutions. Those which are available should be investigated as there may be something in them which could contribute to improvement of solutions which are used in practice. In addition, contrary to Zeigler's notion of personal philosophy as the basis of professional practice, people do frequently act differently in professional circumstance than in everyday personal circumstances. That is, individuals take on a role and act in a manner believed to be expected of them rather than making decisions about what is appropriate behavior.

How: Philosophical Method

In chapter two I elaborate on topical components which serve as organizational format for exploration and construction of a philosophy of sport performance for the professional domain. This includes the major taxonomic subject matter areas from traditional philosophy including questions or problems of being, knowledge, value, and logic. The task proposed is to be carried out as examination of particular problems while delineating the contribution philosophical inquiry can make to the study of sport and movement performance. Basic questions of philosophical inquiry are posed in relation to sport performance to expose principles of practice for each identified problem area.

Major alternatives for each area are explored to identify a perceived prevalent principle and to identify an appropriate principle for an alternative performance model.

In order to provide a coherent structure to this study, a general organizational format is followed for each chapter which corresponds to the questions of 'what,' 'why,' and 'how.' As a systematic inquiry, investigation of each problem area consists of the following five steps: 1) Identification of Problem, 2) Explication of Problem, 3) Exposition of Text, 4) Analysis of Text, and 5) Synthesis of Information. The first two steps correspond to the 'what' and 'why' questions while the remaining three steps correspond to the 'how' question.

1.4 Performance Perspective

I wish to place an actor or agent in the forefront of philosophical analysis. Even in Descartes' theory there was a doubter doing the doubting. In sport there is an actor doing the acting--a person who is performing. There are two aspects to what I am calling the performance perspective: one acts and is acted upon. Yet, even as one is acted upon, that action is performed by other individual selves. Therefore, the root of the performance perspective is the individual person in action as an existential agent. The perspective is not just the individual, but the individual person is an existential agent. This is important because the term individual may apply to other approaches to inquiry including biological and cultural.

The distinction in action perspectives may be further illustrated by noting different types of action decisions. Two types of action decisions may be distinguished through analysis of issues based on participation and regulation questions. Participation questions ask what one as an individual does or ought to do. Regulation questions ask what one does or ought to require others to do. The distinction is based on perception or determination of the nature of the relation between those either involved in or affected by a given issue or circumstance. There appears to be a preponderance of regulation decisions and subsequent attention to analysis of such decisions in professional practice in the human movement domain. Rarely is there attention to 'participation' questions, especially in sport where participation is assumed to be both of a particular kind and voluntary. It is important to note that even actions of regulators can be examined from the performance perspective in terms of individuals in action.

Analysis of problems may focus on either an instance or on practice. An instance is one example, that which is does on a particular occasion. A practice is the occurrence of the same action or circumstance as a matter of usual conduct for a given group of persons engaged in the same or similar activities. Usually a particular instance exposes circumstances which are thought to be problematic for some reason. The performance perspective I take to this project emphasizes analysis of professional practice.

The performance perspective as applied to this project includes attention to individual, intentional, goal-directed action as not only a real possibility but an actual occurrence. Agency is accepted as a basic characteristic of human

existence. The beginning to understanding performance involves accepting an initial definition of performance as action. The philosophy of performance consisting in a philosophy of action attempts to address central problems in this regard with implications for professional practice. There are three key elements, or controlling ideas, which guide the focus of this perspective. These are image, action, and representation. I return to each of these in subsequent chapters.

1.5 Philosophy of Sport

A review of contemporary philosophically oriented literature related to physical education, sport, and physical activity reveals that two kinds of issues are emphasized--social and ethical.[10] This is consistent with a trend in the philosophical literature in sport which has placed emphasis on sport and values. Ethical inquiry seems to be initiated as a response to public pressures that something be done about ethical transgressions in competitive sport. Certainly this was the case in Canada with the "Ben Johnson scandal" which brought to the public's attention 'drug use' in sport. Environmental issues are very much on our minds these days as well and there is some pressure for professionals in recreation programs to respond to these. Yet, when one begins asking questions about whether we are doing what we ought to do in carrying out our professional activity, we can easily discover matters of concern which are not necessarily 'in the news.' That is, a properly focused and in-depth philosophical analysis may

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[10]Hyland, D.A. Philosophy of Sport, New York: Paragon House, 1990 provides the most recent comprehensive survey of such literature

expose professional activities and practices which require further substantiation and justification--or change.

There is much more to the philosophical study of sport than questions of ethics. To suggest that values are of primary importance in identifying problems in sport is to seriously mislead interested and affected parties while avoiding much needed exposure and explication of the problems of being and knowledge along with some other problems of special concern such as technology and excellence. A purpose of this study is to identify and explicate some of the most important problems involved in this type of broader philosophical study. A response to this common perception that philosophy and ethics are synonymous is offered in Chapter Seven where I address the subject of winning as a problem of value, some initial comment is useful here as an example of the process of problem identification.

Values are only one part of the philosophic endeavor and they are also only one part of professional practice. I will argue that a return to traditional values, touted by some even in sport, is not what is required nor is it possible in practical terms. Rather, we need a return to, or a taking up of an intellectual enterprise which integrates the human movement domain, particularly sport. A return to traditional values could quite easily lead us, pendulum fashion, back to a condition of submission to positivism and authority. Even if this could be done, in Chapter Seven I suggest that a more appropriate approach is to increase the intellectual skills and understanding of individuals who make decisions about, not only values, but other questions and problems in the professional domain as well.

In summary, this study addresses philosophical problems applied to the topic, and action, of performance. Those problems are initially derived from the four major taxonomic categories of philosophic inquiry including being, knowledge, values, and logic. Additional problems of particular concern to the professional domain are also addressed. Problems are identified and analyzed through the process of asking basic questions of inquiry including what, why, and how as they apply to sport performance. There is a problem of what performance is--that is there is a problem with understanding the concept itself. There is a problem of why performance occurs in either explanatory or evaluative terms--that is, with the meaning and value of performance. There are also problems of how performance is accomplished--with the means or procedures used. Therefore, three kinds of problems are addressed in this study: problems of concept, problems of practice, and problems of purpose. The problems of concept are addressed in chapter three on the subject of definition. The problems of practice are addressed in chapter eight on the subject of technology. The problems of purpose are addressed in chapter seven on the subject of winning. It is important, however, to note that the problems of concept, practice, and purpose are not only relevant but substantively related to each problem addressed in other separate chapters.

Project Outline

The purpose of this project is to describe and evaluate philosophical foundations and principles of practice in the sport context with implications for

other professional movement practices as informed by interdisciplinary literature from the areas of sport, philosophy, and in part from technology studies, and theatre. Although other areas may also provide useful information, the purpose of this project is best facilitated by those areas noted as applied to problems identified. In the chapters which follow particular attention will be given to discussion areas as follows:

CHAPTER 2: THE PROBLEM OF PRINCIPLES: CHOICE

The purpose of this chapter is to explore problems of philosophy of sport performance related to the question of agency. Philosophical choice is explored as a significant link between philosophical problems and principles of practice. Factors which influence or impede proper analysis of alternatives are explored as problems of choice. Problems of choice are discussed in the areas of unanswerable questions, ambiguity, relativism, agents of choice, and dichotomous thinking. Basic philosophical problem areas are identified and major alternatives for choice are briefly described. A summary of positions produced by consistent choice among predominant alternatives is given toward informing understanding of prevalent foundations for principles of practice.

CHAPTER 3: THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPT: DEFINITION

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the beginnings of a conceptual analysis of performance by focusing on the problem of definition. Problems of definition are discussed in the areas of variable usage and professional

orientation. The idea of performance is discussed along with the language of performance and some major conceptual orientations including notes on historical, current, common, and professional terms. Definition is further explored through a distinction between descriptive and intentional meaning. Conceptual orientations to definition of performance are also briefly discussed to enhance conceptual understanding of the nature of sport performance.

CHAPTER 4: THE PROBLEM OF PROFESSIONS: PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of this chapter is to address central problems in the philosophy of sport performance related to professional concerns. Professional problems are addressed in terms of perspective. Problems of perspective are discussed in the areas of the nature of the professional perspective and the idea-action sequence. Consideration is also given to implications for defining the professional domain including the status and credibility of movement professionals. The professional perspective is explored by contrast with what is called the 'common' problem. Intent involved in the professional perspective is further explored through discussion of possible areas of professional involvement and accompanying objectives.

CHAPTER 5: THE PROBLEM OF BEING: IMAGES

The purpose of this chapter is to explore some central questions about human nature and sport performance. Questions of being are addressed in terms of images of human nature. Problems of image are discussed in the areas of

relevance, cause and effect, appearance and reality, and the basis of practice. Alternative views are explored in terms of open and closed images and conceptual categories which serve as the basis for the practice of performance enhancement.

CHAPTER 6: THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE: EXPERIENCE

The purpose of this chapter is to explore problems of philosophy of sport performance related to knowledge. Problems of knowledge are discussed in the areas of acquisition, expertise, transfer, and the basis of practice. The problems of knowledge are explored with reference to the claim that 'experience is the best teacher.' Educational views and alternatives which serve as the basis for professional practice in the sport context including the historical notion of 'education of' vs. 'education through' the physical, are compared to previously identified images of human nature.

CHAPTER 7: THE PROBLEM OF VALUE: WINNING

The purpose of this chapter is to explore problems of philosophy of sport performance related to the question of value. Questions of value are addressed in terms of the problem of winning. Alternative views are explored in terms of both moral and non-moral objectives of sport performance including the historical topic of process versus product and ethics and the game objective. This chapter further explores contemporary claims that values are the central problem in sport.

This is accomplished via response to a recent publication by John H. Gibson[11] entitled Performance Versus Results. The problem perceived as one of values is suggested as mistaken. Rather, the problem is proposed as one of knowledge about the nature of performance activities.

CHAPTER 8: THE PROBLEM OF PRACTICE: TECHNOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter is to examine problems of philosophy of sport performance related to technology. Problems of technology are discussed in the areas of philosophy of technology, definition, practice, and effect on the human condition. Emphasis of discussion is on application of views of technology to the practice of performance enhancement in the sport context. This is done by exploring two categories of technology types, prescriptive and holistic, as proposed by Ursula Franklin.[12] Technology types are related to professional practice by exploring similarities between professional objective and identified technology types.

CHAPTER 9: THE PROBLEM OF EXCELLENCE: REPRESENTATION

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the problem of excellence as representation. Problems of representation are discussed in the areas of image, excellence, exemplars, and practice. Concern for representation lies in the image

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[11]Gibson, John H. Performance Versus Results: A Critique of Values in Contemporary Sport, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993.
[12]Franklin, Ursula The Real World of Technology, Toronto: CBC Enterprises, 1990.

of excellence represented through the presentation of sport performance. Discussion is informed by literature on the topic of theatrical presentation by Bernard Beckerman in which he distinguishes various types of presentation. Implications for professional practice are drawn from descriptions of iconic presentation and dialectic presentation. The nature of the image of excellence portrayed through sport performance in interpreted according to the notions of iconic presentation and dialectic presentation.

CHAPTER 10: THE PROBLEM OF PROBLEMS: PERSISTENCE

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize relevant discussion points of this study and derive implications and suggestions for the future of sport performance and the philosophical study of sport and human movement. A reflective perspective is used here with organizational referents in terms of past, present, and future. Discussion of the past explores and summarizes relevant discussion on the history of sport performance in terms of tradition. Discussion of contemporary concerns explores and summarizes relevant discussion on the present status of sport in terms of ethical issues, technology, and definition of excellence. Discussion of the next generation explores and summarizes relevant discussion on the future of sport noting suggestions for further study. Four specific areas are identified for particular attention which correspond to major taxonomic areas of subject matter including: a)language, b)cognitive aspects of emotion, c)the political microcosm of sport, and d)the idea of self as a persistent problem.

1.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has provided introductory information regarding a performance perspective to the study of sport philosophy. The nature, contribution, and task of philosophy to the study of sport performance has been given as an ongoing project of evaluation of principles of professional practice and improvement of thinking skills as the basis for individual action decisions. The performance perspective is introduced in terms of the relation between ideas, action, and practice involving individual persons as acting agents. Three kinds of problems have been generally identified for consideration including problems of concept, problems of practice, and problems of purpose. These problems are understood to correspond to the three major questions of inquiry involving 'what', 'how', and 'why'. These problem areas are to be addressed in following chapters in terms of the project outline given. Specific attention is given to core philosophical problems as derived from the four major taxonomic categories of philosophic inquiry including being, knowledge, values, and logic from which are derived principles of practice. Additionally, attention is given to subjects of organization of experience and implementation of action as involving principles of practice.

CHAPTER 2

THE PROBLEM OF PRINCIPLE: CHOICE

2.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the problem of principles in terms of choice. Applying philosophical views to practical action is a matter of choosing from among a number of competing principles. Establishing a philosophical position requires intentional choice from among alternative views. A major concern is the process by which a given choice is made and factors which influence or interfere with that process. In this chapter, I attempt to do two things. First, I identify philosophical problem areas and briefly describe alternatives for philosophical choice. I summarize positions produced by consistent choice and introduce the model which I believe is prevalent model in professional practice. I argue that the prevalent model in the human movement domain is perpetuated by an image of practice portrayed by those in more visible and influential capacities of involvement in sport. Second, I identify factors which influence the process of philosophical choice and designate these as problems of choice for each philosophical problem addressed in this study. Problems of choice are described in terms of unanswerable questions, ambiguity and relativism, agents of choice, and dichotomous thinking.

2.2 The Problem of Choice

Unanswerable Questions

The contribution and task of philosophy come together in the problem of choice. The process of philosophic inquiry involves identification of problems, explication of problems, analysis of problems, synthesis of information, and examination of possible alternative solutions to those problems. The first phase is identifying and explicating problems without which proposals of solutions make no sense. This is illustrated by David Best as he says:

> In any philosophical enquiry it is of the first importance not only to detect errors but to try to discover why we are led to making them.[13]

I would suggest that all sub-disciplinary areas in the study of sport are concerned in some way with causation. Philosophy is not excepted from this. I am not referring here to causation as it is discussed in terms of empirical observation or inference. Rather, the emphasis is the cause of problems--philosophical problems. The way in which practical problems are derived from philosophical problems is a major concern throughout this study. It is my contention that philosophical problems originate with a choice from among alternative views. Philosophical choice provides 'answers' or establishes positions which positions through a process which cannot be done in any other way. There are some questions about one's involvement in this world that can only be answered in a philosophical manner. The answers given or positions taken comprise philosophical choice, whether this is done consciously or unconsciously.

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[13]Best, David Expression in Movement and the Arts, London: Lepus, 1974, P. 15.

There is a popular view, that philosophical problems have no answers, therefore there is no point to talking about them since only meaningful answers may only be derived from questions which can be answered. This reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of philosophy and the problems philosophy addresses as well as the types of questions which are asked. It is certainly a misunderstanding of the nature of the answers philosophical inquiry produces and the benefits of engaging in the process. Philosophical questions often require a choice among alternative answers simply because there is no certain or definitive answer available. The contribution philosophy makes to the problem of choice lies initially in the recognition that a choice will be required and then in supplying the means by which a given choice may be supported, or justified. As one text explains:

> In other words, questions are neither answerable nor unanswerable without qualification. There are no absolutely unanswerable questions--absolutely none! There are only conditionally unanswerable questions. And there are no absolutely answerable questions--absolutely none. There are only conditionally answerable questions. Whether a question is answerable or unanswerable depends on the assumptions of the person trying to answer it.[14]

Ambiguity and Relativism

Philosophy is often charged with being ambiguous and relative. Because philosophy produces no certain answers. Ambiguity may be understood as expressing a multiplicity of meanings such that, again, there is no apparent

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[14]Kolak, Daniel and Raymond Martin Wisdom Without Answers: A Guide to the Experience of Philosophy, 2nd Edition, Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991, P. 10.

answer. This also appears to be an example of lack of choice. The lack of choice is, however, only apparent since the act of refusing to choose because of ambiguity is, in itself, a choice. Ambiguity can be found, for example, in definitions and language used in the human movement domain as well as in ethics. Some might argue that it doesn't matter that we don't know what play, game, sport, or even sportsmanship consists of in terms of definition--we should just get on with it. This implies that there is no significant difference in meanings expressed or used for those terms.

Some decisions, or choices, are made with little time to consider alternatives. Some decisions, however, appear to be of a more enduring nature. Philosophical choices are of this kind. They require time to consider alternatives. There is no justifiable philosophical excuse for not examining alternatives and certainly not for ambiguity in terms of refusing to choose. A refusal to choose on the basis of examined and informed philosophical alternatives is even less acceptable for those advocating and attempting to establish principles of professional practice.

The refusal to choose is frequently expressed as the "who's to say"' question. The best way to answer the question about 'who's to say' is to ask 'who is going to do it". That is, we should consider who it is that is going to act since the one who acts is the one who actually does decide. The common practice of professed ambiguity or position of relativism hides the fact that choices are actually made. Someone does, in fact, decide. There is no philosophical justification for refusing to choose or to recognize that choice occurs. Part of the

problem with choice lies in that refusal. What is required is to attend to choices made with the intent of making them the best possible for the circumstances in which the choice is made. The question remains as to who decides. Who are the possible agents of choice?

Agents of Choice

We can identify two general categories of agents for choice in the performance context. The first category is the performer--the actor engaged in the performance itself. The second category consists of others persons involved in roles or capacities such as therapists, coaches, managers, teachers, and researchers. There is little doubt as to the major locus of decision-making in the sport context. Most decisions in the sport context are made for performers by others, primarily coaches. Indeed, as I say more about later, it is often argued that performance is impossible without a coach.

Dichotomous Thinking

As a matter of convenience and to avoid confusion with the terminology of dualism, I use the term dichotomous thinking to designate the perception that there are only two possible, or meaningful, answers to any given question. That is, the kind of thinking noted is often referred to as dualism. Dualism generally refers to the view which involves separation of objects of thought into two categories. However, since dualism tends to have a particular meaning which is better known in association with views on human nature, commonly expressed

as mind-body, the term dichotomous thinking is used to indicate application of dualistic thinking to the particular problem areas to be discussed.

Dichotomous thinking simplifies alternative answers into two categories. This may be limiting where three or more possible categories are required for a more complete understanding of the subject. For example, some might claim that the usual mind-body expression does not sufficiently account for the aspect of spirituality. Dichotomous thinking also confuses many other distinctions which occur as more than two, including philosophical choices. This study approaches the study of the philosophy of sport by combining two sets of what are called core aspects of study. The first set includes core concepts of the traditional professional domain of human movement identified as play, games, and sport. There are of course others but these three comprise the major initial focus here. The second set includes core questions of the traditional domain of philosophic inquiry identified as being, knowledge, value, and logic. There are clearly more than two categories for each of these considerations. Dichotomous thinking is insufficient to deal with all the categories required to initiate a proper juxtaposition of major features of play, games, sport and questions of being, knowledge, and value.

Dichotomous thinking also confuses beginnings and ends. If there is a beginning, a middle, and an ending, dichotomous thinking would effectively exclude consideration of one of those aspects. Consider what would result if this were applied to a game of chess which is usually planned according to these stages of strategy. If we encounter what may be a continuum or hierarchy of

categories, dichotomous thinking will not allow us to properly complete the sequence of thought in relation to our subject matter. For example, a play-game-sport continuum has been a popular heuristic particularly among sport sociologists. The supposed sequence of progressive complexity and other features could not be satisfactorily completed if conceptualization of these terms was approached with dichotomous thinking. The core questions of philosophy could not be sufficiently addressed if the same were the case.

Dichotomous thinking is a major problem for philosophical choice as it excludes consideration of other potentially useful alternatives. It is not possible for me to elaborate in this study all possible answers to each of the problems identified. In most cases I do only consider two alternatives but I do so in order to provide an alternative to the dominant perception of performance. Not coincidentally this is the alternative I have philosophically chosen. I understand that there are many other alternatives which I have not been able to consider.

2.3 Alternatives

We can identify major alternatives for each problem area addressed in this study. As indicated above, I have identified two major alternative positions--the alternative which dominates the profession and my own alternative. What follows is a summary of these alternatives and choices which must then be made by those involved in the study and practice of sport performance according to the major problem areas identified.

Chapter One addressed the problem of philosophy in terms of action. The

first choice is about the locus of agency, or determinant of action. One cannot refuse to take a position on this question and proceed in any meaningful way to either study or practice performance. The choice is between external determinism or individual agency.

In this chapter I am addressing the problem of principles in terms of choice. The second choice is concerned with choice itself. There is a choice made for each problem area which provides the basis for practice. The major concern is the process by which a given choice is made. As I elaborate, choices may be made according to a process of assumption or justification.

Chapter Three addresses the problem of concept in terms of definition and introduces the third choice as one of definition. Performance may be either described or explicated. One can describe what is happening or what has happened or one can attempt to explicate a deeper meaning of performance according to intent of the performer.

Chapter Four addresses the problem of performance in terms of professions. The fourth choice is that of orientation to professional activity, or professional performance. One may be involved in the same kind of activity in either a common manner or a professional manner. The essential criteria for distinction here is not one of economics, as in getting paid to perform. Rather, it is one of attitude, orientation, or perspective one has toward the manner in which one is involved in performance.

Chapter Five addresses the problem of being in terms of images. The fifth choice is the first of the core philosophical questions about the nature of being,

or human nature. This is related to the first problem concerning agency, however, this choice focuses on the aspect of images of human nature. One may choose among various characteristics to emphasize or priorize in terms of biological, cultural, and autonomous features. The most significant choice in this area, however, is that of either open image or closed image of human nature.

Chapter Six addresses the problem of knowledge in terms of experience. The sixth choice is the second of the core philosophical questions about the nature and sources of knowledge. The question concerns experience as the primary source of performance learning. The choice is that of whose experience is most important in performance, the performer as the actor or some external observer.

Chapter Seven addresses the problem of value in terms of winning. The seventh choice is the third of the core philosophical questions about the value of performance. To many is a question about winning or losing. I argue, however, that the choice is between the process of doing the performance itself or the result of the performance.

Chapter Eight addresses the problem of practice in terms of technology. The eighth choice is concerned with practice. One must decide the manner in which positions previously chosen will be implemented. This is essentially a question of technology. One may be involved in performance practice according to either a holistic or prescriptive technology.

Chapter Nine addresses the problem of excellence in terms of representation. The ninth choice is concerned with excellence. Ideas about

excellence are embodied in the image portrayed, or presented during performance. Performance is a representation of excellence. The significant choice in this regard seems to be that of either iconic representation or dialectic representation.

Chapter Ten addresses the problem of problems in terms of persistence. There is a tenth choice in the current attempt at construction of the basis for a philosophy of sport performance regarding choice itself. Some problems continue while others may not have happened yet. Some problems may have no definitive answers at all. The significant aspect of choice in this regard is whether one's choices about the given questions are taken to be either closed or open. The choice is that of making one's choices, consistent with the nature of problems, historical or persistent. A summary of philosophical problems and choice alternatives is given below and are elaborated in subsequent chapters.

Summary of Philosophical Problems and Choice Alternatives

	Choice A	Choice B
1. Philosophy: Action	Determinism	Agency
2. Principles: Choice	Assumption	Justification
3. Concept: Definition	Descriptive	Intentional
4. Professions: Perspective	Common	Professional
5. Being: Image	Closed	Open

6. Knowledge: Experience	Observer	Actor
7. Value: Winning	Result	Process
8. Practice: Technology	Prescriptive	Holistic
9. Excellence: Representation	Iconic	Dialectic
10. Problems: Persistence	Historical	Persistent

The alternatives identified above have been arranged in a manner which suggests that the positions expressed in each list for each problem areas correspond. That is, a choice from list B is not consistent with the content of choices from list A. For example, choosing intentional as the option for definition, from list B, is inconsistent with the choice of determinism as the option for action, from list A. Although it is not necessarily the case, one would be expected to be consistent in one's choices and positions. If I choose one option from list A, then I should probably choose all options from list A to be consistent in my thinking. The same applies to list B.

Consistent Choice: Model A

Consistently choosing alternatives from list A would produce an overall response to philosophical problems, and subsequently choices, that would be portrayed as follows: People generally have little or no control over their lives. The purpose or meaning of sport is defined by the construct of games in social context. Anyone can be involved in sport in any capacity but the best come from those who have playing experience. People, especially athletes, are naturally

incompetent, ignorant, or lazy, and need direction, control, and discipline. Knowledgable coaching is of primary importance in sport performance. The value of sport is derived from winning. Excellence consists of winners portraying the best of human achievement. Lastly, my position on these questions will never change.

Consistent Choice: Model B

Consistently choosing alternatives from list B would produce an overall response to philosophical problems, and subsequently choices, that would be portrayed as follows: People do have control over the direction of their lives. The purpose or meaning of sport is subject to individual interpretations and motivations. Becoming a competent professional involves an understanding of the sport experience beyond what may be acquired through participation alone. People, especially athletes, are naturally talented, intelligent, and motivated, and need only support and encouragement. The knowledge through experience of the athlete is of primary importance in sport performance. The value of sport is derived from the process of participation, regardless of the outcome of any given contest. Excellence consists of the development and display of individual potentials through the struggle of the contest. Lastly, my position on these questions is subject to change as my circumstances and understanding change.

Dominant Model

Although there may be some flexibility and variation in responses

encountered, it seems that the description of position given for choosing options from list A is the most prevalent model for professional practice. One may also encounter particular instances that seem at variance with this observation. However, the most prevalent practice appears to consists of a basis in philosophical choices consistent with the alternatives given in list A above.

Principles of Practice

The philosophical problems noted have been identified as the most central and significant to the practice of physical activity professionals from which basic principles of practice are derived. That is, the practice of physical activity professionals is based on a given, or chosen, principle for each of the problem areas described above. Investigating philosophical problems in this way can help us discover problems with those principles. *Choice is proposed as the significant link between philosophical problems and principles of practice*. Assuming that those who claim there are problems in the sport world are correct, one might reasonably expect that those problems have some connection with principles of practice. That is, if there is something wrong, it is likely because we are doing something wrong. We, as professionals, are causing our own problems in practice. It is my contention that the philosophical cause of those problems is either an inappropriate or faulty choice which provides the basis for principles of practice. There must be some reason, or cause, for faulty choice. There are factors which influence the process of choosing and the choice which is made. There are then, problems of choice and they may be different for each philosophical problem.

The problem of choice from alternatives noted is more specifically discussed in each chapter as it applies to the particular philosophical problem. The problem of choice identified as having the most significant effect on the process of establishing a philosophical position for particular philosophical problems addressed in this study may be summarized as follows:

Philosophical Problem	Problem of Choice
1. Philosophy: Action	Unanswerable Questions
2. Principles: Choice	Agent
3. Concept: Definition	Agent
4. Professions: Perspective	Agent
5. Being: Image	Dichotomous Thinking
6. Knowledge: Experience	Agent
7. Value: Winning	Agent
8. Practice: Technology	Agent
9. Excellence: Representation	Agent
10. Problems: Persistence	Unanswerable Questions

As we have seen in chapter one, the perception that philosophy consists of discussing unanswerable questions significantly influences the view one has on the question about whether philosophy is part of human action. In this chapter, recognizing the fact that decisions are made in practice, regardless of the perception of philosophy, establishes a locus of choice. Someone does choose.

The significant influence on philosophical choice then, is the question of who actually decides which philosophical position is to be applied--who is to be the agent. Subsequently, each problem of choice, as indicated on the above chart, is discussed in relation to the corresponding philosophical problem in the appropriate chapter.

2.4 Images of Choice

Those who are most visible and influential in sport portray an image of choice through their practice. In the context of influential people who fill certain roles, these roles often foreclose on choice. That is, those involved in sport believe they are expected to act in the same way that others involved act. Action is based on image rather than a consideration of alternatives. This constitutes a choice by assumption. The image of choice predominantly portrayed is, in itself, largely one of choice by assumption. The image portrayed contributes to perpetuation of practice which is either assumed or based on faulty choices.

2.5 The Problem of Choice

The second choice is concerned with choice itself. There is a choice made for each problem area which provides the basis for practice. The problem of choice which is most significant is that of who is to be the agent. Given the pervasiveness of sport, the major alternative choices noted, and the dominant model which follows from suggested prevalent choices, the problem of choice is much greater than one's own individual circumstances of involvement. Faulty

choice in some instances is attributable to the procedures by which choices are made. As most people tend not to be critically reflective about what they do, intentional, focused, informed, decisions are not a common occurrence. Yet, people do act on the basis of chosen positions. The question remains as to what most affects the decisions people do make in regards to their sport involvement. The major concern is the process by which a given choice is made. Choices may be made according to a process of making assumptions or by attempting to justify one's choices.

2.6 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore problems of philosophy of sport as performance related to the question of agency. Initiating action based on principles requires intentional choice in the process of establishing a philosophical position as well as undertaking practical action. Problems of choice are discussed in terms of unanswerable questions, ambiguity, relativism, agents of choice, and dichotomous thinking. Basic problem areas are identified and major alternatives for choice are briefly described. A summary of positions produced by consistent choice is given and a prevalent model suggested. The prevalent model is said to be perpetuated by an image of practice portrayed by those in more visible and influential capacities of involvement in sport. The next chapter begins discussion of performance problems focuses on those related to the problem of definition including notes on meaning, and interdisciplinary perspectives to conceptual emphasis.

CHAPTER 3

THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPT: DEFINITION

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the beginnings of a conceptual analysis of performance. The following discussion of performance problems focuses on those related to the problem of definition. The problem of definition includes notes on what I have been calling the performance perspective, meaning, and interdisciplinary perspectives. The idea of performance is discussed along with the language and some major conceptual orientations including notes on historical, current, common, and professional terms. This is the first major component in the philosophical study of performance which attempts to answer the question, 'What is performance?' The main objective is to ascertain, as clearly as possible, the meaning of performance. An exploration of the concept of performance reveals a potentially significant distinction in designations of referential ideas as definition and meaning. The problem of definition is addressed through a discussion of variable usage, and professional orientation.

3.2 The Problem of Definition

Variable Usage

Although one may think of performance as something that everyone understands, at least implicitly, this is not the case. The term performance is used in different ways in different circumstances and to convey different

meanings. Use of the term performance may be said to be variable. Variability in usage suggests that, in common terms, anything one does may be categorized as performance. Within programs of study in the area of physical education and sport, students are frequently exposed to various 'performance' terms such as peak performance, maximum performance, or high performance. There are also references to different kinds of performance both inside and outside the professional domain such as sport performance, management performance, and economic performance. Discovering that commonality among these is the initial objective of this chapter.

Language is not as fixed as some might have us believe, especially in the world of sport. Language usage changes and concepts evolve or change over time. Some areas of definition may also be treated as "contested terrain".[15] The term 'sport' at one time expressed what we now refer to as 'play'. The meanings attached to the terms play, game, and sport have changed such that sport no longer carries the connotation of playful activity, although the aspect of display remains.

Professional Orientation

It is common to encounter what may be called a contextual assumption in discussion and studies of sport. That is, there appears to be a generalized

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[15]Sage, G. "Beyond Enhancing Performance in Sport: Toward Empowerment and Transformation," in Christina, Robert W. and Helen M. Eckert(Eds.) Enhancing Human Performance in Sport: New Concepts and Developments, Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1992, P. 92.

assumption among many involved that the way sport is now is the way it has always been, it cannot be properly conducted otherwise, and that sport is inherently good. As part of this orientation, sport is not a popular subject for meaningful analysis and criticism within the discipline. As well, professionals concerned are not willing to consider the possibility that sport, as currently practiced, might be better given up or at least substantially different. The context of sport is thought to be somehow 'natural', in ethical terms, and, therefore, exactly what it ought to be. This same orientation is evident in the treatment of definitions. The history of conceptual ambiguity in the physical activity domain has been noted. When this is pointed out, response usually comes in two ways. Either there is not a problem with not being able to clearly define some terms or the 'scientific' approach of operational definitions is sufficient. Each of these responses is problematic in itself.

First, there is a problem with not being able to clearly define, or at least articulate conceptually, terms which provide the core foundation of discipline and professional activities. Sportsmanship is one of the most contemporarily blatant examples of this.[16] It is important that I know what sportsmanship is if I intend, or am expected, to teach it. As an official who is charged with administering penalties on that basis, I need to know the nature of the infraction so that I can properly identify it and apply appropriate sanction. Some claim that it doesn't matter what we call it, we should just get on with it. This criticism suggests that

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[16]Nighswonger, D. "In Opposition to Sportsmanship," in CAHPER Journal, Summer 1991, Pp. 19-23.

some professionals spend so much time attempting to define, or redefine, what they do that they never get anything done. The perception of philosophy as a major player in this process perceived to be 'time wasting' is common and unfortunate. Philosophy done correctly will unavoidably provide guidelines for action. Moreover, claiming that 'it doesn't matter' is either an abrogation of professional responsibility or an admission that professional expertise is not possible.

The scientific approach of operational definitions serves a purpose in focusing one's inquiry of a particular subject. Such definitions offer prescriptive meanings which facilitate the use of empirical measurement techniques. However, this approach provides a limited perspective to definition and understanding of 'what' one is talking about or studying. There is also a limited application of such definitional approach. That is, some terms, such as freedom and autonomy, cannot be properly defined, or articulated, in this way. Some elaboration, or explication,[17] is required. Some analysis in the form of considering alternative views may be needed to clarify meanings as far as possible. One could reasonably argue that the continual use of operational definitions does not allow for historical, social, and cultural changes of circumstance. Additionally, increasing knowledge about a particular subject contributes to the evolving nature of concepts.

Persistence in the philosophic enterprise of explication or conceptual

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[17]Gorovitz, S. and Williams, R.G. Philosophical Analysis: An Introduction to Its Language and Techniques, New York: Random House, 1969, Pp. 101-110.

analysis may be met with charges of doing 'semantics'. Such charges are commonly offered with derogatory connotations again implying that such efforts are a waste of time. The 'operational' approach is also subject to criticism in that a greater danger of arbitrariness exists in any formulation of a definition. Any concept which involves ambiguity in expression, whether justifiable or not, cannot be sufficiently dealt with by 'operationalizing' a definition. An ongoing re-assessment of meanings is part of the continual pursuit of knowledge. It is an essential part of the overall epistemological enterprise. Even our understanding of fact-based ideas depends on the meanings of the words used to express those ideas, or at least agreement as to that meaning.[18]

3.3 The Language of Performance

There are many and varied uses and applications of the term performance. There are also some additional key terms which seem to be consistently attached to discussions of performance whatever the usage. A pilot bibliographic search for this project revealed, among other listings, 198 subject category citations from the Books In Print catalog. Performance is discussed in these texts as titles and classification indicate, with reference to theory, models, evaluation, management, strategy, excellence, attention, compliance, standards, anxiety, practice, interpretation, art, music, business, government, contracts, productivity, competence, power, improvement, planning, and profit. There are other relations

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[18]Arnold, A. Winners: and other losers in war and peace, London: Paladin, 1989, P. 48.

discussed. However, those noted appear to comprise major themes or concerns. Some additional usages encountered which may be more commonly familiar include maximum performance, peak performance, optimum performance, high performance, and extraordinary performance. The meanings of these various usages and distinctions between them are not always so clear as the terms themselves might suggest. Yet, it seems reasonable to think that the origin, or root meaning, for all these usages is essentially the same.

The root meaning of performance is described by The Oxford English Dictionary as consisting of two central and distinctive, but related, aspects of etymology: "to carry through in due form" and "to accomplish entirely, achieve, complete."[19] This is understood to be derived from the Latin 'parform' translated as par(or per) = through, indicating along, over, during, or being of the means by which something is done while form(or formo) = form, indicating to form, shape, fashion, to arrange, order, or regulate.[20] English usage and translations of French usage from the late 12th century to contemporary time includes consistent use of phrases such as 'to carry through to completion', 'to complete', to make', to bring about', 'to carry out', 'to execute', 'to achieve', 'to do or carry out', and variations on the same theme. The only major variation of note occurs in the 20th century in the phrase 'to display extreme anger or bad

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[19]Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, Vol. XI, P. 543.

[20]Marchant, J.R.V. and Charles, J.F. Cassell's Latin Dictionary, London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1935, Pp. 230;400.

temper or to make a great fuss'.[21]

The term performance may be used to denote either a process or action or a series of actions. In the structure of English language sentences, performance is used as a noun whereas the term designates a specified act or set of acts as illustrated, for example, by the sentence 'The orchestra's performance tonight was exceptional.' Performance is also used as a verb whereas the term designates engagement in a specified act or set of actions usually expressed as 'perform' or 'performing'; for example, 'The orchestra will perform a special composition tonight.' Performance is also used as an adjective whereas the term designates or describes things which are understood to be what they are by their relation to a specified act or set of actions; for example, performance art, performance test, or performance bond.

The reference to completeness, finishing, or finished suggests a very close association in the meanings of performance and perfection. The implication is that when an act or set of actions is completed, there is nothing more to be done which could make that particular act or set of actions more desirable or valuable. Engaging in a particular action which may be considered a performance is the embodiment of perfection. The action is done in the most complete or best way it can be done. The result is, in essence, perfect. Some might think that the pursuit of perfection is a valuable enterprise in itself while at the same time believing, with others among us, that perfection is unattainable by human beings.

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[21]Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd Ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, Vol. XI, P.544

Allowing this one might question the pursuit of something one cannot attain. However, one response which seems reasonable might be that although we cannot be perfect in our actions, we can act well. There are ways by which we can determine whether we have acted well, that is , not as the best but rather as the best that we can be at a particular time while engaged in a particular performance. Now we cannot properly refer to this state as perfection as that is something different which, as stated, we believe to be unattainable. We do use a different term to designate this state, particularly in the physical activity domain, although the usage and meaning is not always clearly articulated or understood. That term is excellence. We cannot, as human beings, have or achieve a perfect performance, but we can achieve an excellent performance. We cannot attain perfection, therefore, we pursue excellence. The subject of excellence is addressed more specifically in Chapter Nine.

3.4 Meaning

It is always useful, if not necessary, to begin discussions with a definition of terms to be used, especially when terms to be used may have a technical meaning or when one expects differing views as to the meaning of terms to be used. The usual approach is to provide descriptive characteristics. There is another way, however, to use the term "meaning" which involves providing intentional characteristics rather than descriptive characteristics.. That is, the sense of the meaning of the activity, or expression of why do it-the deeper meanings of involvement. The two senses of meaning, however, are not to be

construed as occurring in isolation, or in mutually exclusive circumstances. They are separated here only for the convenience of analysis and investigation. This is accomplished by initially asking questions about what is done and distinguishing types of answers as a)explaining what is being done as descriptive action and b)explaining what is being done as intentional action.

Descriptive definition consists of emphasis on structural aspects of action including the presence of formal rules and corresponding competitive objectives. Intentional definition consists of informal objectives of both participants and regulators as intentional individual action. The language used to express those aspects represents the meaning intended by those who participate. The distinction between descriptive and intentional aspects is important to our understanding of the problem of definition. James H. Fetzer explains:

> Either we draw the distinctions that we need to understand a problem (in which case, we understand it better with a little effort) or we don't draw the distinctions that we need to understand a problem (in which case, we conserve our effort at the cost of our understanding).[22]

The significance of making this distinction lies in discovering the basis for the logical vocabulary for the sport context; game logic and subsequently, performance logic. The culmination of this logical vocabulary may be expressed in terms of professional practice. Analysis of principles of practice, we recall, was suggested by Robert L. Simon as part of the task of philosophy.

The problem of meaning as expressed by definitions may be further

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[22]Fetzer, James H. Philosophy and Cognitive Science, New York: Paragon, 1991, P. 57.

illustrated in relation to concept-activity, or idea-action, relations as Fetzer says:

> Attempts to codify, to regularize, or to standardize the use of language involves the codification, regularization, or standardization of multiply ambiguous words, where what they are intended to represent, stand for, or mean within a specific communication situation tends to be resolved by contextual cues. They may involve prior information, knowledge, and beliefs shared by the participants in that exchange. These can disappear in the construction of an artificial language.[23]

Since play, game, and sport do seem to be "multiply ambiguous words" there is legitimate concern for the ways in which those representations, or interpretations occur. Professionalization of play, games, and sport may contribute positively to interpretation by properly clarifying the meanings and understandings of ideas which serve as the basis for actions particularly regarding human movement. Perhaps this has already occurred to some extent in disciplinary separations of play as recreational studies and practice, physical education as a public education concern, and sports as athletics which consists of the most competitive aspects of all three. However, since the usual approach to definitions is descriptive, or scientific, there is still some concern about the meaning of performance in terms of why anyone, including professionals, are involved. Further, there is significant power given to (or taken by) organizers. The intent of those organizers then deserves attention. Features of professional involvement which express this meaning are addressed more specifically in the next chapter on professional perspective. At this point, I turn to a more general consideration of perspectives to the meaning of performance.

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[23]Fetzer, P. 60.

Interdisciplinary Perspectives

Human performance has been described, discussed, and studied in a variety of ways and from different contextual perspectives. Similarity in action types referred to as performance in other literature, including dance, theatre, and music expose possibilities for further understanding of the meaning of performance along with principles of practice and accompanying professional objectives for sport. The following is a brief summary of six different conceptual orientations of performance which emphasize different aspects, characteristics, or objectives of performance actions. These include performance as function, performance as being, performance as acting, performance as communication, performance as obligation, and performance as public presentation.

Human performance as function involves defining and exploring the various ways the human organism works in terms of mechanical operation. This is the focus of biological, anatomical, and biomechanical studies. Human performance as obligation involves defining and exploring the various ways the human organism is expected to act as usually determined by some specifically designated social superior or other accepted authority. Human performance as public presentation involves defining the meaning of action with particular reference to the relation between the performer, or actor, and an audience.[24] Human performance as being involves defining the characteristics of performance by reference to some notion about the constitutive nature of the person who is

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[24]Beckerman, Bernard Theatrical Presentation: Performer, Audience and Act, New York: Routledge, 1990.

performing. When one engages in performance as being, that which is expressed is thought to be part of the essential or usual characteristics of the person who is performing. This may also be interpreted to involve what has been referred to as the process of becoming, or self-actualization as the performance contributes to the development of or determination of the performer's characteristics. Human performance as acting involves defining performance as a process of pretending to be what one is not within certain specified boundaries of time and space. Contrary to the notion of performance as being, when one engages in performance as acting, that which is expressed, or displayed for view, is not part of what is thought to be the essential or usual characteristics of the person who is performing. Human performance as communication involves defining performance as a process of conveying information of some kind to those who observe the performance.[25] Although other notions may include the transfer of information as a subsidiary element, here such transfer is either part of the primary intent of the person who is performing or is embedded in the process, the 'form' through which the actions of the performer are conducted. Information usually intended includes such things as a 'moral' to the story or a lesson to be learned.

All of these conceptual orientations are relevant and informative to the overall investigation of performance as applied to the study of sport performance. However, the purposes of this study are best facilitated by giving attention to the aspects of performance as communication and performance as public

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[25]Hilton, Julian Performance, London: Macmillan, 1987.

presentation. Although all of these orientations may receive mention throughout this study, the process of defining, or interpreting, sport performance as public presentation, which includes aspects of communication, will be used specifically in investigation of the problem of excellence discussed in chapter nine.

3.5 The Problem of Choice

The second choice is that of definition. All of the problems of choice indicated in chapter two appear relevant here for the problem of definition. However, dichotomous thinking and who is to be the agent of choice are most important with the latter being most significant.

Play and sport have become conceptually equivocated such that the terms play and sport are used interchangeably to designate the same activities while the term game, sometimes also applied in the same way, is the only real separate activity concept. Play is not considered relevant to performance typically because it is not an ordered, or regulated, activity. The concepts of game and sport receive primary attention based on descriptive characteristics which emphasize the structural aspect of control. It follows that the agent of choice is most significant here in determining the meaning of performance. As to the choice of regarding definition, one can describe what is happening or what has happened according to objective structural characteristics or one can attempt to explicate a deeper meaning of performance according to intent of the performer. The choice of definition, then, is either descriptive or intentional.

3.6 Summary

This chapter has addressed performance problems in terms of definition. Discussion of the problem of definition has included notes on the performance perspective, meaning, and interdisciplinary perspectives. An initial definition of performance was investigated and described, according to extensive variability in usage, as anything one does. The meaning of performance was investigated by distinguishing explanations in terms of descriptive and intentional action. Interdisciplinary perspectives to conceptualization of performance were described as potentially informative based on identification of similarities in action types and concerns across performance disciplines and practices. Similarity in action types referred to as performance in other literature, including dance, theatre, and music,[26] expose possibilities for further understanding of principles of practice and accompanying professional objectives. Six different conceptualizations of performance which emphasize different aspects, characteristics, or objectives of performance actions are briefly described in terms of function, being, acting, communication, obligation, and public presentation. The next chapter continues discussion of performance problems related to professional concerns. This includes attention to the status and credibility of performance professions, especially sport, in terms of the "common" problem, professional roles and professional objectives.

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[26]Schechner, Richard Performance Theory, New York: Routledge, 1988, P. 6.

CHAPTER 4

THE PROBLEM OF PROFESSIONS: PERSPECTIVE

4.1 Introduction

The following discussion of performance problems focuses on perspectives on performance. What I want to do here is say something about what it means to be a professional in the human movement domain. In a sense, I am concerned with definition. However, I am more concerned about the intentional aspects of definition than I am with the descriptive aspects. In my view, less energy is required for establishing descriptive conditions taken to constitute a profession and more is required for understanding the perspective and intent these people share which makes them part of a common group since it is this commonality which provides the basis for professional practice. Philosophical attention to perspective as well as intent can contribute to clarification of the nature of the professional domain and justification of practices.

I explore a professional perspective in contrast to a "common" perspective. I explore intent by identifying potential areas of professional involvement and accompanying objectives. The problem of perspective is addressed through discussion of the sequence of ideas and action, incompleteness of sequence, definition, professional practice, and professional objectives.

4.2 The Problem of Perspective

Professional Perspective

In Chapter One I introduced the notion of the common problem. The common problem arises from the assumption that knowledge is attainable from common experiences of everyday life and that one learns from doing. While there should be a difference between a common perspective and a professional perspective to the human movement domain, professional practice in the movement domain often emphasizes action over ideas such that the ideas which serve as the basis for professional practice are derived from a process of learning about the world. This is more in accord with the common, or everyday, approach. That is, where we might suppose that ideas we have about the world and how things work serve as the basis for action, the opposite seems to be more prevalent in everyday life.

Idea-Action Sequence

It has been suggested that the sequence of ideas and action is different in everyday learning from what occurs in professional practice--or it should be. Herein lies the problem. The sequence of ideas and action in everyday learning is described by Feyerabend[27] as action first, ideas second. Human beings have experiences then reflect on those experiences. This describes the way we learn naturally through everyday exploration and experimentation. The process is easier to see in the actions of children but is taken to be much the same for

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[27]Feyerabend, P. Against Method, Third Edition, London: Verso, 1993, P. 17.

adults. This process is 'common' for each of us. The problem for professional practice is illustrated by W. A. Harper in the article entitled "Thinking: The Vehicle," as he refers to Herman Hesse who says:

> Practice ought to be the consequence of thought, not the other way round.[28]

This appears to be particularly applicable to the formulation of objectives for professional practice which is ostensibly epistemologically superior to common practice.

The influence of a common perspective is historically pervasive. I take this to be what Seymour Kleinman[29] meant when he referred to the status of physical education as a "profession in search of a discipline." People have been involved in actions, purportedly professional, without including reflection on those actions to provide a more informed view of professional practice such that further actions are based on thought.

4.3 Professional Practice

Definition

The terms "professional sport" and "professional athlete" are familiar ones. There is also the historical and conceptual problem of the professional-amateur distinction. The usual basis for such distinction and problem resolution is an

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[28]Harper, W.A. "Thinking: The Vehicle," in The Philosophic Process in Physical Education, 3rd ed., Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1977.

[29]Kleinman, S. "The Significance of Human Movement: A Phenomenological Approach," in Gerber, E.W. and Morgan, W.M.(Eds.) Sport and the Body: A Philosophical Symposium, Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1979, Pp. 177-180.

appeal to economic criteria of some kind such as accepting money for skill performance or some similar involvement. This problem of accepting money for participation in sport has become, in recent years, a non-issue. This is the result of pragmatic economics rather than any kind of conceptual resolution. Not only are athletes allowed to receive payment, but special competitions are now organized for the specific purpose of allowing athletes to 'cash-in' on their popularity. Ice-skating events initiated during the winter of 1994-95 are a good example of this trend. The integration of economic objectives with what might be called game objectives has become more accepted as both a conceptual and practical reality--that is, as part of the game. As one recent author says:

> Professional sport, it seems fair to say, is a primary expression of the American character at the end of the twentieth century. Like money, it is something we love, a first waking thought and a chronic passion, as well as a vast sector of the economy, a wellspring for contemporary myth and totem, and a media phenomenon of the highest order.[30]

Seymour Kleinman objected to the use of 'sport' as a generic term conceptually encompassing all the activities engaged in by those involved in play, games, sports, physical education, and any related movement or physical activity, especially the equation of physical education with sports and games. The conceptual difficulties in defining the disciplinary and professional activities related to these activities still exists. Sport has been used, not only as a catch-all term, but as the model for organizing and studying all other related movement activities and experiences. There is a legitimate question as to whether there is,

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[30]Guterson, D. "Moneyball! On the relentless promotion of pro sports," in Harper's Magazine, September 1994, Pp. 37-41; 44-46.

or should be, such a thing as a professional domain of human movement. The common perspective may be seen as influential in this regard. Individuals involved in professional preparation programs are still commonly perceived as 'gym teachers'. The professional domain is defined more in terms of the common perspective than it is in terms of the professional perspective.

The previously noted sequence of ideas and action is also informative here because ideas about things are expressed, among other ways, as definitions. Words stand for things. They represent the things we do, actions of all kinds, as well as the way we feel. The meanings of words are given not discovered. That is, we make up words to express the meanings we wish to convey or communicate to others. There is no necessary connection between a word and the meaning attached to it. The words we use to describe the things we do are taken to have some particular referent in the real world. If they do not have such a referent, it is fiction.[31]

Definitions also express part of the foundation for professional practice. The words we use in this regard also define the logic of the discipline.[32] T he terms we use and the meanings we attach to them define what we do, how we do it, and why we do it as professional persons. These words identify similarities or meaningful relations between people and actions engaged in similar activities,

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[31]Hospers, J. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960(c1953), Pp. 1-85.

[32]Paul, R. Critical Thinking: What Every Person Needs To Survive In A Rapidly Changing World, Rohnert Park, Ca.: Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique,
Sonoma State University, 1990 P. 559.

such as play, games, and sports. Professional credibility is affected by one's ability to articulate the what, why, and how of one's professional activities.[33] The problem is which perspective, the common or professional, is most influential in defining what movement professionals do.

This is not so much a problem where terms not in general use may be given a specific, technical, meaning by experts who use it in particular context. More specific attempts have been made to describe and implement the process and contributions of philosophic inquiry to conceptual clarification in this regard.[34] However, the commonality of experience of play, games, and sports along with usage of these and related terms in everyday life substantially complicates attempts at definition from the professional perspective. This would appear to be supported by the claim that sport is an expression of what is called public philosophy.[35] Those who have studied the subject matter and practice of sport, physical activity, and/or the variety of forms of human movement are well aware that the common usage of these terms is hardly sufficient to a comprehensive understanding, not to mention explanation, of the meanings expressed by these terms. Some might claim that such terms can only be defined according to the meanings expressed in common usage.[36] However, I would

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[33]Harper, W.A. et al The Philosophic Process in Physical Education, 3rd ed., Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1977.
[34]Zeigler, E.F. "In Sport, As In All Of Life, Man Should Be Comprehensive To Man," Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, Vol. III, Pp. 121-126.
[35]Bishirjian, Richard J. A Public Philosophy Reader, New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1978, includes an article on sport by Novak from his book The Joy of Sports.
[36]Morgan, R.E. Concerns and Values in Physical Education, London: G. Bell & Sons Ltd., 1974.

argue that common usage is insufficient to serve as the foundation for a professional domain of human movement and would certainly be insufficient to support professional practice.

Professional Status

In recent years there has been a substantial increase in creation of professional 'codes.' Whereas these codes were once directed at participants, contemporary emphasis has shifted to those in charge--to 'professionals' -- teachers, researchers, and clinicians. It seems, however, that these codes are as often intended for those who are in charge but who have not been trained as professionals. This raises another problem of definition--who is a professional in the human movement domain? For example, is the volunteer coach who becomes certified by the Coaching Association of Canada a part of the profession?

The professional status of persons involved in physical activities as participant, teacher, organizer, or researcher has not been very clearly established. Those involved in the study of physical activity have continued to disagree about the nature of their professional domain. Volunteers continue to play an important part in provision of related participation opportunities in many communities. Noting what may be described as a decline in public trust of professions and trends toward increase in self-reliance and self-help groups and literature, a profession which has never been clearly defined might expect to have substantial difficulty retaining any control over the activities of persons who study

and practice in various capacities in the field.

Some may argue that professionalization of certain roles in the provision and management of physical activity opportunities should not occur. This position has some merit in appeals to the basis of common experience, possibilities of contribution to further elitism, and the 'free market' system of economics. Whatever approach is used, the foundations and justifications should be explored and expressed as extensively and clearly as possible. This study is an attempt to identify and explore problem areas in the philosophy of sport which may contribute to that clarification. While it is not the purpose of this commentary to establish the characteristics of a profession or to solve conceptual difficulties in that regard, I would suggest that all persons engaged in similar activities which involve identifiable similar elements may be generally taken to constitute the, or a, professional domain. Those similar elements are either based on or derived from professional objectives.

4.4 Professional Objectives

Objectives embody intent. Intent in professional practice requires some consideration for appropriateness in both ethical and non-ethical terms. The common perspective embodies different objectives from the professional perspective even though occupying these objectives may be undertaken in the same activity or activity role. People may be doing the same thing yet with different objectives because they approach the activity and their involvement from a different perspective.

The intent which underlies professional involvement in the movement domain may be exposed by noting predominant objectives embodied in various professional activities. We can begin to understand and explore the foundations of professional practice in terms of objectives by reference to the following categories of professional involvement. In this domain, and perhaps others as well, one can accept three major categories of professional involvement which may be understood as participant, teacher, and researcher. That is, there are people who do physical activity, people who teach in the area of physical activity, and people who study physical activity. These categories are proposed only for the purpose of initiating discussion and are not intended to be comprehensive nor descriptively limiting to actual practice. Other categories may exist in addition to those noted and further categories may occur as the professional domain continues to expand. In any case, it is proposed that what these people have in common, as professional persons, is to be found in the objectives which seem to be inherent in their professional activities. That is, there is a reason why each of them is there doing what they are doing aside from any particular personal reasons for getting involved. Beyond the basic commonality of human movement as the primary emphasis. I suggest three categories of objectives as preventive, rehabilitative, and normative. Professional classification by purpose is determined here according to the status of the client in relation to the intended outcome of the professional's actions in attempting to change that status.

These purposes or professional objectives may be exemplified by groups of physical activity professionals who seemingly pursue these objectives in the

course of their normal activities. Preventive purposes are best exemplified by persons we have come to know as physical education teachers. Persons engaged in this type of activity attempt to prevent the occurrence of undesirable conditions such as injury and illness. Rehabilitative purposes are best exemplified by persons involved in areas known as athletic therapy and adapted or special populations physical education. Persons engaged in this type of activity attempt to correct undesirable conditions, to fix things which are 'broken'. Normative purposes are best exemplified by persons involved in competitive sport coaching. Persons engaged in this type of activity attempt to pursue specifically defined desirable conditions. This group works with otherwise normal people to make them better than they currently are in some way.

Although any given individual in the professional roles of participant, teacher, or researcher may incorporate all three kinds of objectives in their activities as part of their professional role, it is important to both an understanding of the professional domain of physical activity and to consistent resolution of problems and issues to determine a hierarchy of priority for those objectives for any given role, person, and circumstance. Professional objectives are further contrasted with performance objectives in chapter seven on the subject of winning.

4.5 The Problem of Choice

The third choice is that of orientation to professional activity. One may be involved in the same kind of activity in either a common manner or a

professional manner. The most significant problem of choice for professionals is that of agency. This is derived from the influence of the common perspective itself. Professionals must recognize and accept themselves as agents of choice. Through the influence of the 'common' problem, other noted aspects of ambiguity, relativism, and unanswerable questions also influence one's choice. The danger is that the nature of professional activities, as a matter of choice, are determined through choice by assumption rather than by justification. For professional practice, this is not acceptable. One can be involved in sport and movement activities according to the common perspective which includes action then interpretation or one can be uncommon and work out one's ideas prior to professional practice by engaging in considerable reflection to ensure a more complete understanding of the activities, in both senses, which contributes to articulation of views and justification of practices. This can only be the result of an intentional goal-directed orientation toward accomplishing these conditions. The perspective then, is a matter of choice. The choice is that of either a common perspective or a professional perspective.

4.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has addressed performance problems focusing on those related to professional problems. Professional status and credibility of performance professions in terms of the "common" problem, illustrates both a historical and persistent philosophical problem for the professional domain in terms of the foundation for qualification as an expert participant in designated

professional positions. The same problem of locus of determination also applies to roles, as a sociological concept, as well as determination of objectives for professional roles and particular actions. Professional roles have been identified as consisting, historically and organizationally, of those designated categorically as participant, researcher, teacher, and manager. Professional objectives corresponding to identified roles have been described as categorical types including preventive, rehabilitative, and normative. Although sport may be, in some sense, a unique context of human endeavor, the performance aspect of that context is not unique to sport. Other performance professions are identifiable and appear to be concerned with the same roles, objectives, and professional concerns. Interdisciplinary study of performance, then, appears to be further justified.

The remainder of this study involves discussion of core philosophical problems identified as being, knowledge, and values as well as selected domain relevant problems identified as technology and excellence. The next chapter continues examination of philosophical choices in philosophy of sport with a review of alternative views and choices pertaining to the problem of being as images.

CHAPTER 5

THE PROBLEM OF BEING: IMAGES

5.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the problem of being in terms of images of human nature and addresses implications of these images to an understanding of performance. Images of human nature affect how we act both personally and professionally. We treat ourselves and other people according to the ideas we have about who or what we are. Images of human nature are relevant to an understanding of performance in the human movement domain because these images affect professional practice. Movement professionals often begin with an image of human nature as deficient in some way and then attempt to devise ways to correct those deficiencies. This process is frequently referred to as performance enhancement. As I elaborate in this chapter, performance enhancement is based on a "closed" image of being or human nature. As an alternative to this closed image, I introduce the notion of an open image of human nature.

5.2 The Problem of Images

> There is seemingly no more important single element in the dynamics of culture than a complete image of human nature.[37]

People act and interact with other people based on ideas about human nature

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[37]Chaney, N. P. 7.

in everyday life. At one time it was thought that one could tell the character of a person simply by observing the characteristics of the body. Body type, facial features, and the shape of the head were popular indicators. Some terms from that era, such as lean and mean or fat and jolly, are still used to describe character of individual persons. Whether we like it or not we do make judgments about people based on our observations of their body features. The initial image we have of other people is that which we acquire by observation. The image is further enhanced by observations of how a person walks, talks, and by other actions.

Most people seldom think very deeply about what human nature is, even while making philosophical choices based on images about human nature. Chaney notes:

> When we speak in terms of images, we aren't raising the deeply philosophical question of what human nature is as a thing-in-itself. With the concept of images we are moving away from questions of pure being toward questions about ourselves as thinking creatures. Instead of trying to say what the human really is, we are concerned with trying to say what the human thinks he or she is.[38]

It is my contention that images of human nature are as important to the human movement domain as any other domain, even though this may not be immediately obvious to many. The relevance of an understanding of human nature to the human movement domain may be made more clear by looking at ways in which images operate as cause and effect. Chaney says:

> ...as effect, inasmuch as it starts from and is limited by an interpretation of human life that is current at the time of its origin;

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[38]Chaney, N. P. 5.

> as cause, inasmuch as, in the further course of time, the image itself helps bring about the formation and fixation of habits of thought and conduct divergent from those that prevailed before it.[39]

In relation to the sequence of ideas and action for professional practice in the physical activity domain, it has been suggested that one possible consequence is that rather than using human nature to define performance, sport is commonly used to define human nature.[40] This claim may have some validity especially when we recognize that most people are not reflective about what they do and the nature of the physical activity domain has been an action discipline.

5.3 Image Categories

There are many different theories of 'human nature' including the idea that there really is no such thing. All of these theories appear to have some common elements which, when recognized, expose the major emphasis or controlling idea involved in each such that we can categorize them according to that major emphasis. A review of categories is useful in helping us understand what kind of philosophical choices people make about human nature. For this purpose, I find categories proposed by Norman Chaney and Kenneth Bock[41] most useful.

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[39]Chaney, N. P. 7.

[40]Lenk, Hans "Philosophical Considerations in Human Performance," in Clarke, D.H. and Eckert, H.M. Limits of Human Performance, Champaign, Ill.: Human Kinetics, 1985.

[41]Bock, Kenneth Human Nature Mythology, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1994.

Ideas, or images, of human nature have been categorized by Chaney into three general conceptual categories: original, cultural, and autonomous. What Chaney refers to as original human nature refers to the physicality of human life as it has developed through evolutionary processes and explains how human life-forms differ organically from those of other creatures. Cultural human nature explains how humans, as distinguished from other creatures, have shaped and remade the world in accordance with their social needs. Autonomous human nature involves ideas about human nature as it is manifested in the life of the person and explains how individuals, in unique, self-chosen ways, express their difference not only from other creatures but also from other persons.

Each person's image of what human nature is may include ideas from all three of these conceptual categories with one of those three dominant. Also, as indicated earlier, it is likely that dominant ideas about human nature in the professional domain may be different from one's personal perspective.

According to Bock, views of human nature are either what he refers to as open or closed. The closed view of human beings:

> presents a human as invested with qualities that give rise to a certain course of action. If choice is possible it must still be choice shaped by a given tendency or proneness, which is unalterable by choice or anything else. Closed conceptions of humanity specify restrictions on the freedom of people to direct their lives, restrictions that lie within people themselves. External restrictions can be seen in either the physical or social environment, but this also involves judgments about inherent human weakness in the face of such obstacles.[42]

In a closed conception, there is a human 'nature' which is definable and static.

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[42]Bock, K. P. 8.

That nature is depraved, evil, or sinful as heavily influenced by religion. Individual persons are not, in fact, free to choose but rather are pawns subject to compelling external physical or social forces as influenced by scientific mechanism and social determinism. People are subject to similar internal forces such as drives or needs as influenced by psychological determinism. Even if people were free to choose their capacity for reason is insufficient to counter those forces noted above in any meaningful way.

In contrast, Bock claims:

> An open conception of human nature represents people as both free and obliged to form their thinking and their conduct by their own actions in a material and a social world. The organic apparatus they bring to this task is seen as a given, because we know little, so far, of its influence in the production of differences in thought and action among humans. The human animal is distinguished by this capacity and this necessity to form itself by its activity without blueprint or direction from any other source.[43]

In an open conception, there is no fixed 'nature' as such. There may be some recognizable common features of existence known as conditions in which we live in this world. The basis of this view is that people are free to choose and, in fact, do so within constraints and influences that occur as part of those conditions. Beyond this, people are defined mostly by what they do--by their actions. There are no principles of behavior, only principles of action where principles precede action in terms of goal-oriented, intentional action.

There are some implications here for movement professionals. For example, the closed view, which Bock also claims is the persistent Western image,

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[43]Bock, K. P. 8-9.

suggests that intervention makes no sense because character or human nature is static and cannot be changed. Even the contemporary advocacy of empowerment makes little sense for beings who have no capacity for meaningful decision-making. The most serious problem of images derived from consequences and implications for action is described by Bock in the following terms:

> The disregard for evidence, the logical problems, the dilemmas, and the spurious appeal in arguments from human nature are troublesome in themselves. And the tireless reiteration of the story of human frailty is irksome. But it is the charge of human impotence that is the ultimate affront to human dignity.[44]

This means that when someone tells you that you have to accept things as they are because there is nothing you can do about it, simply because it is human nature to be incompetent, insignificant, and powerless, you have been deeply insulted. This is more than a pessimistic view. The expression of this view applied in this way precludes even the possibility of meaningful action.

5.4 Images of Being

Chaney's classification of ideas about human nature, or images, may be called descriptive categories while Bock's classification may be called normative categories. If we compare these categories in matrix fashion, some interesting possibilities emerge. Conceptualizing human nature as dualistic is consistent with the closed image category. The closed image portrays an inferior being living in a hostile environment. Any meaningful existence occurs not in this world but some other yet to come. There are, then, two aspects to existence one of which

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[44]Bock, K. P. 7.

is consistent with the conditions described for the physical world and the other is consistent with the conditions of the world yet to come. The 'better' of the two natures and worlds is not this one. Implications for practice would seem to involve following the advice of Plato, as this is consistent with his idealistic world view, and attempt to get out of this world as soon as is humanly possible.

Describing human nature as holistic could be consistent with either the open or closed image category. The open view is more conducive to an understanding of the individual as an acting agent in this world pursuing purposeful activity. The closed view promotes mind-body dualism and original and cultural conditions are considered to be more important than autonomous conditions.

Since we proceed from claims about the content of human nature to action, the image of human nature with which one starts has great consequence. It is a contention of this study that many problems in professional practice are effects of either assuming that humans are without agency or ignoring the potential capability for each individual to, de facto, make decisions and act on those decisions. The performance perspective I have described earlier is based on an image of human nature which construes human beings as capable of making decisions for themselves and acting on them within or subject to external influences and constraints. Individuals are basically, for all practical purposes, agents of their own action.

Professional practice in the human movement domain often removes individual human beings from their own actions. They are not seen as or they are

ignored as intentional acting agents. I believe that the problem here is a mistaken choice in the characterization of human nature for an explanation of conduct. In part this is due to an overemphasis on an application of a scientific approach to people--a positing of external laws of human nature similar in characteristics to natural laws of the physical world. This effectively removes human actors from meaningful accounts of social and cultural evolution. The thrust of sociology in constructing laws of society in a scientific sense excludes human actors. One significant implication of this is that sociology, as a social science, cannot engage in meaningful moral inquiry. Advocating social change, as many people seem to do, takes the focus off agents of change--human actors--and explanation of what people do occurs mostly in descriptive terms rather than intentional terms.

I have argued that images of human nature provide the basis for justification of professional activities. Professional practice in the human movement domain in large part consists of elaborate procedures of intervention. Images of human nature provide the basis for identifying deficient conditions required for intervention. In order for a human movement profession based on intervention to exist, one must be able to identify that which is to be changed or enhanced--one must be able to identify ways in which an individual or individuals in one's professional purview are deficient. The locus of that deficient condition is the participant, the student, or the athlete. There is an assumption or a demonstration by some criteria that something about the person should be changed. Deficiencies can only be identified if one has some image about the

constitution, characteristics, the 'nature' of the person which provides the basis for making this assessment and deriving evaluative criteria. In Chapter Six I say more about the assumptions about human nature which permit intervention by human movement professionals.

5.5 The Problem of Choice

The fifth choice is the first of the core philosophical questions about the nature of being, or human nature. This is related to the first problem concerning determinism, focussing on images of human nature. The choice involves the most comprehensive image one can assemble from ideas about the characteristics of human beings, or human nature. One may choose among various characteristics to emphasize or priorize in terms of biological, cultural, and autonomous features. The most significant problem of choice in relation to images of human nature is that of dichotomous thinking. If we think in terms of only two alternatives, this precludes the possibility of discovering other potentially useful ideas about human nature. In the history of philosophical ideas, there are four major categories of essential characteristics of human nature which are generally known as idealist, physicalist, dualist, and integrationist. The idealist view portrays an immaterial substance as the essence of being. The physicalist view portrays a strictly material substance as the essence of being. The dualist view attempts to combine features of both idealist and physicalist views. The integrationist view merges, or integrates, the idealist features within the material substance as part of one complete being. Dichotomous thinking is part of the first three of these views.

The fourth is not so influenced as all previous ideas are merged into one complete image. Even if we can accept a complete image of human nature in this sense, there are still features of existence which may be distinguished and discussed in other ways. That is, although I may recognize that there is one being, one person, there are still different aspects of that person which I can emphasize, talk about and attempt to understand further. If we recognize the influence of dichotomous thinking and accept that one of the categories of images noted by Chaney is likely to be dominant in that thinking, this implies that the problem of choice consists of selecting two major alternatives from available images, or image categories, and either assuming or justifying one as the basis for action. The choice in this area of either open image or closed image.

5.6 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore some central questions about human nature in relation to performance. Questions of being were addressed in terms of images of human nature. Alternative views were explored in terms of open and closed images and conceptual categories which serve as the basis for the practice of performance enhancement. Comparison of image categories reveals a negative emphasis in attempts to define human nature. This negative emphasis has significant implications for practice in the movement domain, especially sport. One might recognize a possible sequence, or hierarchy, of application which connects the personal aspects to the professional such that images provide the basis for conduct, as individual action, treatment of oneself

and others as personal interaction, and treatment of others as professional practice. One could reasonably claim that performance both begins and ends with image. It begins with the basis of image in human nature and, as I elaborate in Chapter Nine, it ends with an image of representation.

Although there may be no definitive answer to the question of being, or human nature, we should be aware that the basis for action is formulated as images. This should allow for the possibility of change as our ideas, information, knowledge, and understanding of human nature changes.

CHAPTER 6

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE: EXPERIENCE

6.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore problems of philosophy of performance related to the claim that "experience is the best teacher". Since learning through experience is an existential fact and we can all learn from experience, there seems to be nothing to distinguish common experiences of sport from a professional perspective. How is it possible to both acknowledge the importance of experience and allow for an expert? If experience is necessary for learning, is it possible for someone who has not had a particular experience to teach it? If experience is the best teacher, then what is the basis for the claim that an external agent--a coach--is necessary for learning to occur? My discussion in this chapter is related to the previous discussion of images of human nature. I explore the problem of experience in terms of acquisition, expertise, transfer of knowledge, and the basis of practice.

6.2 The Problem of Experience

Acquisition

Coming to know about the world is, in fact, an experiential act. It happens from the inside out. Those who recognize this in 'common sense' terms frequently support the view that "experience is the best teacher". Paradoxically, the same people may claim that a coach is a necessary part of an athlete's

performance.

An elaboration of this 'common problem' in epistemological terms exposes some of the practical aspects of knowledge problems for performance. Although there are some interpretive considerations involved in responding properly to the statement "experience is the best teacher", there is a common acceptance of the claim that people learn more effectively by doing something, being actively engaged in the process, rather than by watching others or by hearing or reading about it. If philosophy could be said to be a process of thinking backward as it involves an interpretation of one's experience, it seems that one must necessarily have experience, or engage in action, prior to thinking about that experience or having any meaningful ideas about it. This sequence is supported by Feyerabend as he says of the learning sequence of children:

> They use words, they combine them, they play with them, until they grasp a meaning that has so far been beyond their reach. And the initial playful activity is an essential prerequisite of the final act of understanding. There is no reason why this mechanism should cease to function in the adult.[45]

This also helps illustrate the epistemological value of play. Seymour Kleinman argues that physical education, when approached as a phenomenological endeavor, facilitates acquisition of knowledge meaningful to individual existence. This knowledge is acquired through a general understanding of the meaning of movement.

> To the phenomenologist, to understand the body is to see the body not in terms of kinesiological analysis but in the awareness and meaning of movement...[T]hus movement becomes significant not

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[45]Feyerabend, P. P. 17

> by a knowledge about the body but through an awareness of the self--a much more accurate term.[46]

The implication here is that doing physical education is comparable to doing philosophy. This is an individual process of learning as self-discovery. If "physical education", like philosophy, is a process of self-discovery, there is a legitimate question to be asked about the role an external agent, particularly an interventive agent, can and should have in this process. Kleinman argues that the scientific approach, understood as external observation, is inappropriate to the process of acquiring self-knowledge because analysis of movement by external observation moves the individual farther away from the 'experience' of movement.

Kleinman offers a distinction between physical education and sports and games which, in my view, is important to understanding the problems of knowledge which follow from making appropriate conceptual distinctions. Sports and games, although providing certain satisfactions, are said to be limited in potential avenues of acquisition of self, or philosophical knowledge.

> Games provide satisfactions and fulfill a need to play and compete, but I contend that it is not the function of physical education to take as its responsibility the teaching and playing of games, especially when there is so much more that can be done in the way of enhancing fulfillment and realization through movement.[47]

He claims further that a purposeful realization of the 'self' "is not the purpose or function of sports and games." It is difficult to ascertain whether this claim is a moral claim. However, use of the term 'function' is suggestive of a sociological perspective which explains actions in terms of external locus of determinant or

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[46]Kleinman, S. P. 178-9.
[47]Kleinman, S. P. 179.

control. This then cannot really be a moral claim as intent cannot be accounted for properly in a description of function.

Consider the following comment from Mortimer Adler:

> The pleasures of play are intensified by great skill in one's participation in whatever sports or games to which one is inclined. One has to use one's intellect to acquire such skill. But that use of the intellect, taken together with its use for economic or even political advancement, is hardly a sufficient use. While it is not a total abstinence from intellectual activity, it is certainly an inadequate employment of whatever degree of intellectual power we have.[48]

The judgment made here is clearly a confusion of social or personal value, and intellectual or educational value. It may be that participation in sports and games is and has been motivated largely as a diversion from daily routine of work. This would seem to have some value in itself for the participants involved. However, to imply, as he seems to do, that participation in sport, games, and similar movement activities has minimal intellectual value is to seriously misconstrue or misrepresent the nature and process of knowledge involved in such activities. While Adler offers some valid criticism of leisure theory, this should not rule out a more focused inquiry on the epistemological foundations of sports, games, and movement activities. There is some intelligence involved in these endeavors. Those involved have known this for some time. There has been some difficulty, however, in expressing and articulating what participants know when they participate in human movement.

I would suggest that the problem of knowledge, construed as a lack of

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[48]Adler, M.J. P. 187.

knowledge in sports and games, is not one of the activities themselves. As I elaborate, it is the result of a traditional theory or perception of value which is not consistent with an appropriate theory of knowledge for these activities.

Expertise

I have asked how it is possible to justify experts in the human movement domain when there is such widespread common experience of human movement activities. If there is a distinction to be made between professional and common knowledge about sport in particular, the distinction is to be found in the types of beliefs each have about sport.

> ...people do not hold questionable beliefs simply because they are stupid or gullible...our questionable beliefs derive primarily from the misapplication or overutilization of generally valid and effective strategies for knowing.[49]

Gilovich notes the link to experience:

> We hold many dubious beliefs, in other words, not because they satisfy some important psychological need, but because they seem to be the most sensible conclusions consistent with the available evidence. People hold such beliefs because they seem,...to be the 'irresistible products of their own experience'. They are the products, not of irrationality, but of flawed rationality.[50]

Ideas are very much affected by everyday life experience and often are not the result of any kind of focused intellectual or scholarly endeavor. Witold Rybczynski observes:

> Superstitions emerge out of daily practice, not scholarly inquiry.

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[49]Gilovich, T. How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life, New York: The Free Press, 1991, Pp. 2-3.
[50]Gilovich, T. Pp. 2-3.

> They are learned at a grandfather's knee, or with one's playmates, not in school. And the fact that they evolve out of a general consensus, rather than being imposed, makes them all the more enduring.[51]

The world of sport is still superstition-ridden. Informed, educated, rational people engage in practices in the professional domain which are not consistent with claims to professional expertise based on rational inquiry. Superstition and common practice significantly influence principles of practice in the context of sport to the extent that any claims to professional, scholarly expertise appears irrelevant to the "common" person. Sport is something about which most people claim to have some knowledge. Even students in professional training programs may be seen, to some extent, to possess reduced respect for professional claims to expertise in their own chosen field. Given the exposure to play, games, and sport prior to engaging in professional studies, as previously noted, there is little doubt that the noted "common" problem is substantially significant to any attempts or claims to establishment of professional expertise. Moreover, when a recognized basis for expertise in coaching is previous experience in the activity, the emphasis once again is on experiences commonly had rather than on possession of particular epistemological expertise. Yet, if we are to be consistent with the philosophical position that of action follows thought, teaching, or more specifically coaching, should be conducted on a sound basis of ideas and understanding about how people learn. This is particularly important if one expects to transfer what one has learned through experience.

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[51]Rybczynski, Witold Waiting for the Weekend, London: Penguin, 1991, P. 39.

Transfer

Although education may not appear to be a primary emphasis for all professionals in the movement domain, most professionals are concerned with the transfer of knowledge. I have argued that utilizing knowledge gained from personal experience as the basis for professional practice poses some potential problems.

In her paper, "What Do We Know When We Know A Game", Margaret Steele[52] attempts to provide us with a model of knowledge acquisition to serve as a basis for teaching. Her emphasis is on creating an exemplar, a model, or example which is observed and copied. She interprets experience as empirical, working in an inductive manner. She implies but does not sufficiently explicate a distinction between the knowledge of participants and that of a coach.

The problem of knowledge identified by Steele is derived from the question: "What kind of knowledge is required to engage in a game or a sport?" Although the answer is never given specifically it takes the general form of "it cannot be taught but you need a coach to get it".

Steele thinks that learning occurs inductively and through exemplars. She does not consider learning deductively. Inductive knowledge is based on experience.

> The first kind of learning is inductive, which is best described as forming expectations about future experience on the basis of past

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[52]Steele, Margaret "What Do We Know When We Know A Game?" in Galasso, P. J.(Ed.) Philosophy of Sport and Physical Activity, Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1988, Pp. 114-122.

instances.[53]

Steele claims that inductive learning is the basis of everyday life as well as science. Steele claims that coaches do not engage in 'telling'. She claims that observation of exemplars is often sufficient for learning in everyday life, but in sport one needs help from exemplars. She assumes that these exemplars must be coaches.

Steele writes:

> First of all we have to know what it is we want to be able to do. We have to be shown the skill by another person, or a picture or diagram. In other words we have to have an exemplar.[54]

According to Steele, in order to learn one must know what is to be accomplished yet the individual cannot discover or decide this for oneself. The learner must be told. Yet Steele claims that 'telling' is not what coaches do. Coaches are necessary. Steele has chosen a foundation of action based on an image of human nature which is negative, and incompetent.

Steele favors "guided self-discovery" for coaches. She claims that coaches function as facilitators in the student's own process of discovery. This is a commendable idealistic or normative perspective. However, there is an 'ought-is' problem here. Facilitation, or guided self-discovery, is not prevalent, by design, in the dominant practice of sport professionals. Steele claims, the most basic aspect of learning is the holistic gestalt felt by the performer during the act of skill performance. Skill learning cannot be taught, but must be practiced.

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[53]Steele, M. P. 116.
[54]Steele, M. P. 116.

Strategy and tactics must be developed and modified creatively on the field or court by the performer as the game happens. It is not clear what role external agents can actually play in this gestalt. If coaches are implicated in an approach of guided self-discovery, I believe that it cannot be by design.

Contrary to Steele, I believe that the dominant approach to coaching is, in fact, telling. This paternalistic telling is not consistent with guided self-discovery. Steele is mistaken in claiming that guided self-discovery is, in fact, what coaches do. To deny that paternalism has provided the basic operative principle of practice in organized competitive sport is inconsistent with the claims that it is necessary to have a coach.

If telling is what coaches do, and telling is incompatible with learning, then learning is not a primary professional objective of sport performance. Although learning of some kind may occur in all sport circumstances, some sport circumstances, or contexts, for example 'professional sport', do not primarily involve educational objectives. The primary objective of professional sport is to win games, and subsequently, championships. Any other objectives, including educational ones, are ancillary to this one. In this context, 'telling' may be the only contribution a coach can make to the performance. Applying acquired skills in game situations according to pre-designed game plans involves telling. Sport performance becomes a job, a circumstance in which one executes acquired skills to complete a given task as directed, or as per job description.

Steele focuses on 'physical nature', the body as an object in a world governed by natural laws. This is acceptable, and necessary, as far as it

contributes to our understanding of knowledge. In my view, it does not go far enough to include 'human nature' in that physical world. For this we need something else. For a better understanding of the transfer of human movement skills, I turn to the work of David Best[55] in which he describes and applies the notion of "kinaesthetic empathy".

The problem addressed by Best is how knowledge comes to be transferred from an external agent to a specified learner who is actually experiencing the movement. He extends this question to spectators who are thought to relate in some way to movements of performers they observe and thus appreciate and enjoy, or not, those performances. What Best means by "kinaesthetic empathy" follows from the recognized commonality of movement experience. Bodies are constructed similarly, bodies may be moved in similar ways, therefore the sensations associated with those movements are also expected to be similar. Steele's exemplar works because of experiential induction. As a learner, I may not be able to execute movements, in terms of skill performance, as successfully as some others. I can, however, empathize with or relate to the sensations associated with those movements.

The aspect of skill learning described by Steele as holistic based on feeling 'what it's like' to move in a certain way is only teachable by demonstration--the exemplar. One does not need to do more than demonstrate for some basic movement simply because of the commonality of bodily existence and movement

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[55]Best, David Expression in Movement and the Arts, London: Lepus, 1974, Pp. 141-152.

experience. What makes the technique of demonstration by Steele's exemplar effective is kinaesthetic empathy.

If we understand sport, as we do other forms of movement, as a public presentation, the audience also deserves some attention. There are questions about why the audience is there in terms of how watching others engaged in movement performance can be meaningful whatever social or psychological motive one attaches to the original act of attendance. These questions are addressed more specifically in chapter nine on the topic of excellence and representation.

Basis of Practice

Positing experience as the basis of professional practice raises questions about appropriateness of certain approaches to learning and teaching regarding movement, particularly when scientific or observable knowledge is contrasted with somatic or experiential knowledge. This is particularly relevant to activities involving expressive movement such as dance, figure skating and gymnastics. Each approach may have something to offer. However, the nature and limitations of each, along with other possible alternatives, need to be explored to determine appropriateness to movement activities.

Thinking and doing in professional activities, at least historically, appear to be treated as distinctly separate activities with a specific hierarchy of priority which places doing at the top. The sequence of ideas and action may have

significant implications for interventive practice. Feyerabend suggests that the commonly accepted sequence for professional practice involves ideas preceding action.

> It is often taken for granted that a clear and distinct understanding of new ideas precedes, and should precede their formulation and their institutional expression.[56]

In interventive practice, this would imply that action is based on or follows from ideas about people who are the objects of intervention. Harper has reinforced this notion as applied to the professional physical educator. The problem is illustrated as follows:

> If the past and present moments of physical education were testimony to our having understood the proper sequence between thinking and having reasoned beliefs, there would be few occasions for physical educators to improve in this respect. Misunderstanding of the necessary sequence between thought and belief often leads to our having to think, so to speak, backwards. That is, we are forced to think after, not before, taking our position. For example, the requirement to engage in physical education in the schools, historically speaking, has produced some of this backtracking to which we refer. Many of the more colorful reasons and explanations for requiring physical education were given to account for an already existing practice. The beliefs underlying this practice surfaced only by thinking back to discover what we must have believed in order to have taken the action in the first place.[57]

There is an important distinction to be made here which could easily be overlooked involving translation of knowledge gained by personal experience into professional practice. Personal experience is communicated as directives, or commands and are often confused with instructional objectives. Donald A. Norman, writing about knowledge uses sports instruction as an example of an

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[56]Feyerabend, P. P. 17
[57]Harper, W. et al, P. 41.

appropriate pedagogical approach to facilitate learning:

> There is an important difference between playing and practicing, doing an activity and learning that activity. Just doing something does not necessarily lead to learning. This point is well understood in sports instruction. Coaches distinguish between unsupervised play and training. You could play for a hundred hours and learn less than from a half hour of properly supervised training. In training, the coach carefully sets up the condition to be practiced and provides appropriate feedback and guidance so that the player can benefit from the experience.[58]

Few would claim that no benefit can be obtained from the advice or comment and observation of others in attempts to improve movement performance. However, Norman also implies as does Steele that coaches are necessary for learning. I suggest that he seriously misunderstands the epistemological nature and the epistemological value, of play. Norman admits the participant's contribution to the process in concentration and focus as part of 'the experiential mode'. However, he also advocates shifting responsibility for the philosophical knowledge to an external agent:

> To be a good player requires concentration and focus: the essence of experiential mode. But to learn, to improve, to train oneself--that requires reflection upon the performance, the better to know what to change and what to keep. A coach provides the reflection for the player. Without a coach, self-reflection is required to think about and analyze one's own activities. Self-reflection is more difficult than the reflections provided by the coach.[59]

My initial response to Norman, both as a person and an athlete, is one of affront. I understand him to be saying that self-reflection is required and difficult, therefore I should let someone else do it for me. He appears to assume that

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[58]Norman, D.A. Things That Make Us Smart, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1993, P. 36.
[59]Norman, D.A. P. 36.

athletes are incompetent thinkers and subsequently have little to no capacity for acquiring, understanding, or using philosophical knowledge. This also implies that there is little value in philosophical knowledge, the self-knowledge, or knowledge acquired through the process of self-reflection while in experiential mode. Or perhaps, he does not believe that thinking is or should part of one's experiential mode for sports. If so, I would also suggest that he seriously misunderstands the nature of sport. Norman would also appear to reinforce Kleinman's claim, by popular perception, that attention to 'self' is not the purpose of sports and games. Again, we see a contemporary expression of the negative image of human nature emphasizing external locus of action determination with specific application to the sport context.

Guided learning and performance, especially in movement activities, may be appropriate in some circumstances and for younger relatively inexperienced age groups. However, for the older, adult, experienced, and usually educated, movement participants, the interventive agent should not have the same role. That is, the potential contribution of an interventive agent to the performance is different. Rather than perpetuating an institutionalized dependency relation, professional movement educators should not only allow but require athletes to be involved in the analysis process of performance. This is a requirement for better understanding of the performance itself and the meaning it has for the participant. Norman would appear to condone athletic performance without knowledge on the part of the participant since in his view performance can be accomplished simply by following the directions of some external agent, the

coach. Whether or not it is the case that performance can be achieved in this way, it is my contention that it is necessary for coaches to pay more attention to what they are doing in terms of what, why, and how, if one is going to engage in instructional activity in sport.

6.3 Experience and Professional Practice

The Problem of Coaching

The importance of coaching is, in practice, commonly assumed as a necessary component of athletic performance, especially if one is to be successful. Discussion of coaching is important if for no other reason than to explore claims for the necessity of a coach. However, there are other reasons for attending to coaching as a philosophical problem. The most significant of those possibilities lies in the recognition that the 'coach' or someone occupying a role or position designated as 'coach' is the most prevalent focal point for implementation of practice in the movement domain.

Coaching, as an activity, may be discussed as a problem in two central areas, articulation and justification. First, problems may be derived from attempts, or lack of, to articulate what it means to be a coach and the activity which follows from a given conceptualization. Second, problems may be derived from examination of activities conducted as coaching activity according to some criteria of appropriateness. It should be noted, however, that such examination need not be a moral inquiry. Questions of appropriateness may also apply to other aspects of evaluation including the metaphysical and epistemological

foundations of those activities.

There are two aspects of coaching activity to which the problems of articulation and justification may be meaningfully applied. These aspects are epistemology and politics. There is a connection between these two aspects in the designation of authority. The problem from which all others in this discussion seem to follow appears in a prevalent confusion in the meaning and application of the term authority simply because it applies to both areas of discussion, knowledge and politics.

The common problem may be illustrated in recognizing that one aspect of authority may be emphasized in practice over the other. Non-professional persons occupying roles designated as 'coach' might, for example, apply political authority as a priority over authority of knowledge. Clarification of the distinction between common and professional perspectives to this problem may be approached initially through the writing of Paul Weiss:

> Reflective men try to act only after they have acknowledged a program. They not only try to realize a prospect, but want their acts to be justified by having them in accord with what the program requires. Most men, though, act without ever isolating or knowing a program. They nevertheless exhibit its structure, usually learning what it is in somewhat the same way in which they learn a grammar or manners, through imitation and repetition. This is particularly true of athletes. They perform their tasks in consonance with some program, but rarely do so by taking account of what it requires. Instead, they allow the program to form the background of their consciousness. It is usually only when they criticize or correct themselves, or, more often, when their trainers and coaches criticize and correct them, that they bring the program to the fore and make some reference to it.[60]

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[60]Weiss, P. P. 72.

The term 'program' I take to embody what has been referred to here and elsewhere as context. There is significance to the distinction between a common perspective to context and a professional perspective to context specifically applied to coaching. Weiss suggests that athletes are not, for the most part, reflective about what they do, how or why unless failure results in the need for correction, or criticism is offered by an external agent.

There is an understanding of the meaning and appropriateness of activities and actions in the domain of movement, particularly sport, among everyday people, which conflicts with claims and expectations of expertise on the part of informed, reflective professionals. However, it seems that we can readily discover that the common perspective is also implemented in the professional realm of movement activities. That is, the professional domain of movement, particularly sport, does not generally appear to be concerned with reflective thinking, or critical self-analysis. The claims and expectations of expertise as a knowledge base for professional activities becomes questionable when authority is political rather than epistemological.

The focal point for implementation of practice in the movement domain lies with the coach, as it does in many others. However, 'sport' coaching is a much more formalized, and institutionally supported, activity. Because we are addressing, or identifying, what amounts to a microcosmic governmental system in practice, the structure and justification of that system needs to be delineated, understood, and analyzed. There is a useful distinction to be made here between

government of laws and government of people.[61] Coaching is arguably a government of people. That is, the activity is implemented according to the dictates of a particular person, based on experience or some other source of knowledge, rather than being guided by appeal to a set of recognized, justified, and accepted laws which constitute the nature of coaching activity. There is no constitution for the activity of coaching as a governing activity.

Articulation

Those who engage in coaching might be reasonably thought to define coaching by what each of them does in that capacity. We can easily encounter various ideas, practices, and conceptualizations of coaching among those practicing what is called coaching activity. The only commonality among all practitioners may be identified as either assumption or ascription of authority as either special knowledge or political power. The problem of articulation, then, is frequently solved by some combination of appeal to necessity, knowledge, and power. A survey of literature on the topic of coaching philosophy reveals problems of articulation. Most articles directed at philosophy of coaching are technically oriented despite the philosophical title. Philosophy is presented in these articles as an opinion on whatever the author wishes to talk about provided there is some connection to sport. Granted, philosophy allows, even requires, a broad consideration of topics and relations between experiences and ideas. These

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[61]This distinction which ostensibly comprises the definition of democracy is noted in Van Doren, Charles, A History of Knowledge, New York: Ballantine, 1991, P. 301.

articles, however, portray deficiencies in philosophical focus and coherence. Moreis said about this in the section on coaching philosophy below.

Justification

The problems of justification and articulation are not entirely separate concerns. Descriptions of contributions coaches can make to an athlete's performance, which are provided as articulation of roles, may also be offered as justification for coaching activity. Perspective is one approach sometimes used for this purpose. Again Paul Weiss provides a good beginning:

> Participants can see a game only from limited positions, but coaches--the term is used here to refer also to managers and others who decide the strategy--can take account of both sides, and note what seem to be their major strengths and weaknesses. Coaches, therefore, can have knowledge that is available to no one else.[62]

Claims of unique knowledge as indicated in the above quote imply an argument of justification from a position of paternalism. Paternalism as a mode of practice confuse aspects of knowledge and political power by failure to attend to proper distinctions and evaluations of other perspectives. Subsequently, we encounter the contemporary, and persistent problem referred to as the liberty-authority conflict. There is a different perspective to justification if one is asking questions about one's own participation than if one is asking questions about regulating others' participation. Each of these perspectives results in different solutions to problems encountered simply by asking different questions, or rather by asking

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[62]Weiss, P. Sport: A Philosophical Inquiry, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.

the same questions in different ways. Basic questions may be asked about the problems of knowledge and political power from each perspective. The distinction in perspective is effectively illustrated by Patrick Devlin as he says:

> We who belong to the societies of the United States or of the British Commonwealth or of other like-minded peoples say that we belong to a free society. By this I think we mean no more than that we strike a balance in favour of individual freedom. The law is the boundary that marks the limit of authority and it is not drawn in a straight line. As it traverses the field of human activities it inclines from side to side in some allowing much more freedom than in others. At each point we try to strike the right balance. What I mean by striking it in favour of freedom is that the question to be asked in each case is: 'How much authority is necessary?' and not: 'How much liberty is to be conceded?' That the question should be put in that form, that authority should be a grant and liberty not a privilege, is, I think, the true mark of a free society.[63]

If it is true that individual freedom is one of the primary foundations of our Western society in general, one begins to wonder why, in sport, it is assumed that an external authority in the form of both knowledge and political power is necessary.

Coaching Philosophy

Although it has been suggested that a philosophy of coaching is something which is developed over time and through years of experience, this appears contrary to the notion of planned intervention which is the primary activity of coaches. Coaching has been described as an intentional activity with a normative objective. As a normative activity, there must be a goal to be pursued whether or

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[63]Devlin, P. The Enforcement of Morals, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, P. 102.

that goal is known consciously. The link between performance, value, and coaching may be illustrated by reference to the work of Aristotle as he says of goals:

> If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and vain) clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more likely to hit upon what is right? If so, we must try, in outline at least, to determine what it is, and of which of the sciences or capacities it is the object. It would seem to belong to the most authoritative art...the master art. And politics appears to be of this nature.[64]

It has also been suggested that:

> While it may be important in most activity-related professions to be a so-called people person, it is more important to be a sport, dance, or exercise person. The crucial relationship in the movement professions is not between the teacher and student, coach and athlete, or physical therapist.[65]

I take this to mean that the knowledge base or interest in the activities of sport, dance, or exercise, those activities which constitute the movement based professional domain, is of primary importance to the professional person. However, the separation of subject matter and relationship in the movement domain cannot be done in practice, therefore, it should not be done in theory except to facilitate understanding of either one. What this view fails to consider is that the subject matter of the movement professional *is* the people with whom

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[64]Adler, M.J. Ten Philosophical Mistakes, New York: Macmillan, 1985, P. 166.
[65]Kretchmar, R.S. Practical Philosophy of Sport, Champaign, Ill.: Human Kinetics, 1994, P. 226-7.

one works. Without the client, the performer, there is no professional practice. Participants do not get involved in movement, particularly sports, for the purpose of being taught about physiology, biomechanics, psychology, or any other specific aspect of professional interest. People get involved in these activities because of the exploratory and challenging aspects which are more related to learning about oneself. Those who hold this view and believe that the nature of the relation between say, a coach and an athlete has nothing to do with achieving success in performance are mistaken. The idea of relationship seems to carry a negative connotation. This only makes sense if one makes, or perceives, the relationship to be negative. This position carried into professional practice is consistent with Steele's idea of coaching as telling. By this view, professional practice is based on normative objectives administered by some didactic method. As a professional, I get the information and either tell you what I know or tell you what to do based on what I know. This position supports the mechanistic philosophy of what is has been called "technocratic physical education."[66] More will be said about this notion in chapter eight on technology.

6.4 Images of Knowing

The problem of images is a recurring question which illustrates the persistence of the problem of knowledge in relation to ideas about human nature, or what it is to be a person. Discussion of this topic is usually presented in terms

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[66]McKay, Jim, Gore, Jennifer M. and Kirk, David "Beyond the Limits of Technocratic Physical Education," Quest, 42(1), April 1990, Pp. 52-76.

of 'views of the body'. One author claims:

> Philosophically, the discussion of physical education as "education of the physical" or "education through the physical" was and is a key distinction among approaches in physical education.[67]

Saul Ross[68] addresses one of the most basic problems of knowledge--the assumption of the separation of mind and body as distinct entities. Ross criticizes mind-body dualism as an inappropriate foundation for what has been called physical education. There has always been a problem in describing the manner by which the mind and the body, as two distinctly separate entities, can interact. If knowledge is acquired via sense experience through the body, there are serious questions about how that information reaches the mind as a separate entity. The implication is that the mind cannot be educated through the physical and the body itself has no educational capacity. The greatest difficulty is brought about by the philosophical choice regarding human nature. Dualism excludes the possibility of any meaningful acquisition of knowledge, especially through the body which is of primary concern in movement activities.

Ideas about knowledge are bound up with ideas about human nature. In order to ask meaningful questions about how a particular person knows anything, we need to have some understanding of the nature of the being or the organism in biological terms, about which we can ask those questions. At the same time this is also a question of value. It is common to hear philosophical discussions

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[67]Mechikoff, R. and Estes, S. A History and Philosophy of Sport and Physical Education, Madison, Wisconsin: Brown & Benchmark, 1993, P. 17.

[68]Ross, Saul "Cartesian Dualism and Physical Education: Epistemological Incompatibility," in Galasso, P.J.(Ed.) Philosophy of Sport and Physical Activity, Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1988, Pp. 164-176.

about sports and games beginning and focusing on educational or social value. The primary emphasis in such discussions is the questions of what we can learn from sports and games which will make a positive contribution to society. Historically, what we know as 'physical education' has been discussed as an educational issue addressing basic questions of knowledge. This has been done in terms of 'education of the physical' versus 'education through the physical'. The reason for this approach is derived from attempts to justify inclusion of physical exercise programs, sports and games in school curriculum.

I contend that what one may learn through play is the nature of existence and involvement in this world--one's physicality. What one may learn through games are the rules of accepted social interaction in various contexts, one's cultural nature. What one may learn through sport is the nature of involvement in this world as an intentional existential agent--successful completion of goal-directed action within, or based on, one's individual capabilities. Sport performance consists of intentional action, using the tools provided by one's original nature, executed within cultural context. By learning how to perform one may also learn what it means to perform in terms of what is being done and why.

Juxtaposing these activity emphases with Chaney's categories from Chapter Five, we can see that each generally corresponds to a specific category. Play corresponds to the original nature category, games corresponds to the cultural category, and sport corresponds to the autonomous category. Applying the open and closed image categories proposed by Bock from Chapter Five exposes the apparent exclusion of sport from appropriate epistemological

concerns as the closed image in practice does not allow or account for autonomous aspects of human nature as positive characteristics.

6.5 The Problem of Choice

The sixth choice is the second of the core philosophical questions about the nature and sources of knowledge. The question concerns experience as the primary source of performance learning. The choice is who is the agent of choice.

When the experience of the actor is considered to be most important, there is a recognition that the experience of the actor contributes most to the ability of the actor to perform. This includes the view that the knowledge gained from the experience itself is a primary objective of participation. Knowledge gained from the experience of participation is existential in the sense that no one else can do it, and no one can do it in the same way that anyone else can do it. When experience of the observer is considered to be most important, it is assumed that a coach is necessary and that there are aspects of the performance experience which are common to all who participate which further implies that there is a correct and incorrect manner in which to perform. Additionally, it is assumed one cannot discover this for oneself but must be told by an external observer. I have argued that, if the expertise of the observer is, or has been, acquired through experience, particularly experience of participation, then the claim of external necessity is not valid. This is because the current performer may acquire the same knowledge in the same way that the so-called expert has

done. Those who argue for the necessity of a coach make a choice between assuming the necessity of a coach and justifying the necessity of a coach. The choice is whose experience is most important in performance-- the performer as the actor or some external observer.

6.6 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore problems of philosophy of performance related to knowledge. Problems of acquisition, expertise, and transfer have been examined with reference to the claim that "experience is the best teacher". By juxtaposing image categories noted in Chapter Five, prevalent professional practice is exposed as providing inadequate opportunity for learning through the sport experience in terms of autonomous aspects of human nature.

In the end, intelligent performance is not something which can be taught. Locus of both learning and performance lies with the participant who, by force of will, or intent, decides to pursue a goal as defined by game objectives. Only the learner as participant, as actor, as acting agent can do these things. It is a gross philosophical mistake and an insult to the participant to suggest otherwise. To say that some aspects cannot be taught is recognition of the performance perspective presented in this study as a condition of human existence. The participant is primary and the emphasis on external necessity is inconsistent with this existential fact. Learning by influence of others through interaction does occur, but the claim that sport coaching is necessary for learning does not follow from that factual observation.

There is a distinct lack of significant intellectual content in dominant images which are portrayed through various forms of media; images produced by dominant technology. There is then, an extension of the knowledge problem into the domain of technology as practice. The technology of image or the practice of image production in the domain of sport will be addressed more specifically in Chapter Eight on technology.

CHAPTER 7

THE PROBLEM OF VALUE: WINNING

7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to explore problems of philosophy of performance related to questions of value. Alternative views are explored in terms of both moral and non-moral objectives of sport performance including the historical topic of process versus product and ethics and the game objective.

The value of something is simply taken to be that which makes that something of interest to whoever has an interest in it. The significance of value may then be derived from recognizing that value provides the basis for goal-orientation. That which is pursued, as a goal, is that which is desired or of interest. This chapter explores contemporary claims that values are the central problem in sport. This is accomplished via discussion of process-product, intrinsic-extrinsic values, and emphasis on non-moral values in response to claims that contemporary problems in sport are the consequence of valuing winning over the process of participation. I propose that this problem is not a problem of value but a problem of knowledge about the nature of performance activities

7.2 The Problem of Winning

In his book Performance Versus Results: A Critique of Values in Contemporary Sport,[69] John H. Gibson addresses what he claims to be a

[69]Gibson, John H. Performance Versus Results, New York: SUNY Press, 1993.

problem of values in contemporary sport. Gibson writes that the value of participation is determined by whether one wins rather than by subjective, experiential and personal dimensions. The root of contemporary emphasis on results, according to Gibson, stems from the explosion of rationality and objectivity that characterizes the Enlightenment. Rational inquiry by scientific method has led to the priority or prevalence, even dominance, of objectivity as the criterion of truth. Application of reason and objectivity produce greater attention to instrumental values. That is, the value of things and actions is derived from contribution to achieving a particular goal, or result.

The Enlightenment is taken to be the pivotal historic event, cataclysmic in Gibson's terms, which "set Western culture on its route to contemporary values."[70] The important consequence of this era is individual freedom from traditional interpretations of the world by some, or any, external, absolute authority. Individuals began to have the freedom to think for themselves. The subsequent application of rational thought and reason in terms of science produced another problem. As Gibson says:

> ...the problem created at this juncture was that the scientific method that grew out of the Enlightenment could not discover, detect, or create values.[71]

Application of reason to existing values and standards seemed to result in the systematic destruction of all previous sources of value and social stability including religious beliefs and the existence of God. The resulting situation

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[70]Gibson, J. P. 9.
[71]Gibson, J. P. 12.

involved emphasis on private rights and self-interest.

John Locke, well known British empiricist, played an important part in promotion of a new epistemological view during the Enlightenment which emphasized the importance of information acquired via the physical senses. The shift in sources of knowledge resulted in a corresponding shift in sources of value which suggests that the problem is not one of values but rather is one of knowledge, or a particular approach to knowledge which produced the value orientation. It is my contention that we need to re-assess our approach to knowledge not our approach to value. In order to begin this re-assessment, a few brief comments about John Locke's work.

Locke argued that the basis of all knowledge is empirical. Knowledge consists of ideas--there are two sources of ideas which consist of sensation and reflection. Gibson's account of instrument of scientific knowledge de-emphasizes Locke's concern for reflection. Although Locke based his theory of knowledge on an image of human nature as 'the blank slate upon which experience writes', the notion of reflection allows the possibility of some action on the part of the perceiver regarding processing of incoming sensory information. By ignoring reflection, intentional intellectual action can be overlooked as a capability of individual persons. This has important implications for understanding why individuals act in certain particular ways.

While, one might accept the influence of science in establishing current dominant practices and perspectives in the professional domain of sport and physical activity, I do not agree that rational thought itself is a major contributor.

Rather it is the lack of appropriate development of rational thought and its application that has been a major shortcoming. When reflection is not considered a real capability of individual persons, then no attention is given to it in educational endeavors. It is my perception that this is, and has been, the dominant practice in the physical activity professional domain. What is required is attention to developing thinking skills. Better thinking may not result in better action. However, the potential would be much greater.

Basis of Practice

It is thought that the primary objective of games is to win. Subsequently, winning appears to be a priority objective of professional practice in sport. The pursuit of winning at any and all costs in sport or games, is inconsistent with both acceptable moral criteria and game objectives. As I elaborate below perceptions to the contrary are based on misunderstanding of game logic and a misconception of sport. Pursuing winning to the exclusion of attention to subjective value of participation diminishes both the quality of the experience for participants and professional credibility.

7.3 Performance Objectives

Professional Objectives

Earlier I proposed a general categorization of professional objectives for the purpose of discussion as preventive, rehabilitative, and normative. To reiterate, a preventive objective is exemplified by the activities of a teacher or

fitness leader. Persons engaged in this type of activity attempt to prevent the occurrence of undesirable conditions such as injury and illness. A rehabilitative objective is exemplified by the activities of a physical therapist. Persons engaged in this type of activity attempt to correct undesirable conditions, to fix things which are 'broken'. A normative objective is exemplified by the activities of a sport coach. Persons engaged in this type of activity attempt to pursue specifically defined desirable conditions. This group works with otherwise normal people to make them better than they currently are in some way. The value of pursuing these objectives as professional practice is derived from the contribution to the value of the activity. In this section I consider another set of professional objectives--participatory objectives.

Participatory Objectives

The relation between value and participatory objectives may be explored through discussion of what is called the paradox of sportsmanship. The paradox of sportsmanship lies in recognition of apparently conflicting contributions and requirements in performance activities. The conflict appears in a general expectation of doing 'good' actions when the performance activities require or allow doing 'bad' actions which contribute to success. The paradox of sportsmanship is illustrated in the work of James Keating, entitled "Sportsmanship as a Moral Category."[72]

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[72]Keating, James "Sportsmanship As A Moral Category," in Gerber, E.W. and Morgan, W.J.(Eds.), Sport and the Body: A Philosophical Symposium, 2nd Edition, Philadelphia: Lea & Febiger, 1979, Pp. 264-271.

Keating uses a conceptual distinction between sport and athletics to explain confusion about appropriate action in sport. Appropriate action is determined by objectives embedded in the context. According to Keating, the objectives of sport are playfulness and generosity while the objective of athletics is victory. Expecting athletes to act in a manner contrary to activity objectives is unreasonable. As he says:

> The strange paradox of sportsmanship as applied to athletics is that it asks the athlete, locked in a deadly serious and emotionally charged situation, to act outwardly s if he were engaged in some pleasant diversion. After an athlete has trained and sacrificed for weeks, after he has dreamed of victory and its fruits and literally exhausted himself physically and emotionally in its pursuit--after all this--to ask him to act with fairness in the contest, with modesty in victory, and an admirable composure in defeat is to demand a great deal, and, yet, this is the substance of the demand that 'sportsmanship' makes upon the athlete.[73]

Later in the same article Keating suggests that:

> It is the contestant's objective and not the game itself which becomes the chief determinant of the conduct and attitudes of the players.[74]

The context determines what is appropriate action but the participants act within that context to pursue their own objectives. The emphasis on pursuing the objective of winning is defined by the game rules, the context. There appears to be some inconsistency in claiming that participant objectives supercede the game objectives. They are, in effect, as Keating describes them, the same. In any case, the implication is that usual moral considerations commonly expressed as

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[73]Keating, J. P. 269.
[74]Keating, J. P. 270.

sportsmanship are contrary to both game objectives and participant objectives in what Keating calls athletics. My contention is that winning may be a problem but it is not a value problem. Rather, it is part of a misunderstanding of the nature of the game objectives which effectively separates the process from the product. This may be initially exposed through discussion of what is usually called the over-emphasis on winning.

The Over-Emphasis On Winning

I agree with Keating that expectations that athletes alter their pursuit of winning are quite unreasonable. The game objective is winning. I also happen to think that there are other values involved with participation, particularly experiential value associated with both self-definition and knowledge. Winning is more than an instrumental value. There is also experiential value in winning. The 'winning is everything' phrase expresses the extreme of this value. Variations on this theme express an experiential reality in value terms. Winning is good, losing is bad.

As I indicated earlier, claims that winning is a value problem are mistaken. When the nature of activities are understood more clearly, what appears to be a value problem is exposed as a problem of knowledge including problems of definition and external control of the determination of value determination. Those people who are allowed to participate, reasons they are allowed to participate in terms of contribution to success, and the manner of participation

in terms of how contributions are made, are all primarily determined by persons other than the participants themselves. If there is an over-emphasis issue it is not an over-emphasis on winning. Rather, it is an over-emphasis on external control. The problem of control is discussed more specifically in the next chapter on technology.

Winning and the Game Objective

Doing the 'right' thing, as a moral objective, is entirely consistent with the basic principles of game logic. Contrary to the idea that morality is irrelevant in sports and games, a moral purpose is precisely the whole point of it. Basic elements of morality are built into the constitutive nature of games which serve as the conceptual and practical basis for the construct of sport.

There are conflicting views on this point. Some claim that morality in the form of fairness, is inherent in the activity itself. Others claim that any 'overriding' moral considerations actually deter from the pursuit of activity objectives and therefore, are not applicable. My contention is that both views are mistaken. Morality is not inherent in sport on the basis of fairness but moral considerations do contribute to pursuit of activity objectives.

Rules are an essential constitutive aspect of games which also provide the basis for sports. Rules thereby define the boundaries of acceptable conduct. There are legitimate questions to be asked about the use of any given rule or set of rules as a definitive guide for moral conduct. Game rules are, or were, not made to be broken. The purpose of making rules is not so that people,

participants particularly, should intentionally attempt to break them. The purpose of rules is derived from the intent of those who make them, sometimes referred to as the spirit of the rules. The intent behind game rules is connected with the game objectives.

Paul Weiss one of the first to engage in modern philosophical analysis of sport wrote in 1969:

> The objectives and tests relevant to a game are different from those which characterize a war ....What is sought in a war is victory in fact, expressed, not in some judgement given by an official, but in acts of submission to the victor. The objective of a war is a defeat of the enemy somehow. The objective of a game is the production of results acceptable to both sides. The road to victory in war is through the subjugation of men by injury or destruction, and the breaking of their economic, social, and political power. The road to victory in athletics is through the exhibition of excellence in men, even in those who are defeated.[75]

The emphasis on instrumental reason which defines the game objective as only winning is more consistent with Weiss's description of the objectives of war. This is a mistaken perception of the nature of games and hence a knowledge problem and not a value problem.

Part of the misperception is the exclusion of ethical considerations from the process of game playing. Unless the game objectives are morally unacceptable, inappropriate, or by some criteria determined to be evil, we can accept the basic decency of goals expressed by game rules and the means by which those goals are to be pursued. That is, games are decent. It is not the case that game rules are neutral or that morality is irrelevant, but rather that a basic decency, in moral terms, is inherent in the process of participation in games, and

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[75]Weiss, P. Pp. 179-180.

subsequently sports, which includes following the rules to the best of one's ability.

> Given that what is wanted is decent, it remains the case that it cannot be pursued by every and any means. Means and ends come under a common moral scrutiny.[76]

The moral content of games is constructed by the intent of those who made, or make the rules and enacted by those who participate in the game through acceptance and adherence to the rules. One cannot complete the game objectives without engaging in moral conduct. The pursuit of winning at any and all costs in sport, or games, is inconsistent with game objectives.

7.4 Images of Value

In this section I juxtapose previously identified images of human nature with major ideas about the value of performance. As a reminder, ideas, or images, of human nature are categorized by Chaney into three general conceptual categories; original, cultural, and autonomous. Original human nature involves human life as it has developed through evolutionary processes and explains how human life-forms differ organically from those of other creatures. Cultural human nature explains how humans, as distinguished from other creatures, have shaped and remade the world in accordance with their social needs. Autonomous human nature involves ideas about human nature as it is manifested in the life of the person and explains how individuals, in unique, self-chosen ways, express their difference not only from other creatures but also from other persons.

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[76]Phillips, D.Z. P. 87.

When the value of performance is cast solely in terms of winning, justification for valuing performance in this way is often based on an original image of human nature in which the goal is to survive--a survival of the fittest ethic which contributes to the evolutionary process. Survival is a quantitative rather than a qualitative aspect of experience. The cultural image category may also contribute to seeing the value of performance only in terms of winning. For example, sport may have primarily international political significance where winning is central for political prestige. The cultural image emphasizes social needs and involves attention to benefits of participation which accrue external to the performer. The value of winning is also applicable to the autonomous image category. Accomplishing tasks or achieving objectives through victory in contests which others may not be able to do may be seen as an exercise of one's autonomy. Yet, because not everyone is exactly alike in performance ability or execution, any performance is unique to the individual performer. In my view, only the autonomous image of human nature permits a recognition of subjective, personal, experiential value for performance.

7.5 The Problem of Choice

The seventh choice is the third of the core philosophical questions about the value of performance. At first this appears to be a question about winning or losing. I contend, however, that the important question about value is that concerning which aspect of performance has the greatest value--the process or the outcome or result.

A value conflict occurs when it appears that one must sacrifice a winning outcome in order to enhance the experiential value of participation. The value of sport in terms of outcome or results involves priority of winning over subjective, experiential and personal dimensions. The value of sport in terms of process is derived from participation in the experience itself regardless of any particular outcome. The choice regarding value is either the process of doing the performance itself or the result of the performance.

Often the choice of what is to be the most important value is taken away from the participant. As I discuss more fully in the next chapter, emphasis on winning as professional practice compounds external influence.

7.6 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore problems of philosophy of performance related to the question of value. Questions of value have been addressed in terms of the problem of winning. Alternative views were explored in terms of both moral and non-moral objectives of sport performance including the historical topic of process versus product and ethics and the game objective. Contemporary claims that values are the central problem in sport have been reviewed and rejected. The problem of winning at all costs which is thought to be a problem of values is instead a problem of knowledge about the nature of performance activities. Taking winning as the only objective of games to which both participants and professionals must subscribe is to underestimate the process

by which objectives are pursued and achieved. Further, emphasizing winning in this manner as an external value diminishes the potential for subjective value of the experience of sport participation through which self-definition, self-determination, and self-development may occur.

The next chapter continues with a consideration of the manner in which ideas about human nature, knowledge, value, and objectives are applied in professional practice through a discussion some central problems of technology.

CHAPTER 8

THE PROBLEM OF PRACTICE: TECHNOLOGY

8.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine problems of philosophy of sport performance related to technology drawing from literature on philosophy of technology and technology studies in general. Emphasis of this discussion is on application of views about technology to the practice of performance enhancement in the sport context. This is done by exploring two categories of technology types--those that are prescriptive and those that are holistic, as proposed by Ursula Franklin. Technology types are related to professional practice by exploring the professional objective of sport coaches, as normative, in relation to previously discussed principles derived from ideas about human nature, knowledge, and values. The problem of technology is discussed in terms of philosophy of technology, definition, and practice.

8.2 The Problem of Technology

Philosophy of Technology

Like sport, technology has not been subjected to widespread critical assessment via philosophical analysis by its practitioners. The term "technological somnambulism" is used by Langdon Winner to describe this condition in the development and use of technology. Two reasons are noted by Winner as contributing to this condition of non-evaluation. First, the idea of progress has been a major influence on social thought during the industrial age. Second, it is

thought that the human relationship to technical things is too obvious to merit serious reflection.

Winner divides the range of possible concerns about technology into two very general categories which he designates as making and use. The problem category of 'making' involves questions about how things work and how things are made to work. The problem category of 'use' involves as he says:

> ...nothing more complicated than an occasional, limited, and non-problematic interaction.[77]

Winner explains this perception as follows:

> Because technological objects have a promiscuous utility, they are taken to be fundamentally neutral as regards their moral standing.[78]

Technology is seen by many to be an emancipatory phenomenon because technology allows us to do things we could not do before, or otherwise. Technology liberates us from the constraints of our natural condition, it makes life easier, more comfortable, more enjoyable, and enhances performance. Therefore, it must be a good thing. However, as Winner explains:

> The crucial weakness of the conventional idea about what technology is and what it means is that it disregards the many ways in which technologies provide structure for human activity.[79]

Although structure may be considered a positive aspect of social conditions, there is an inherent normative aspect to structure, especially those structures which are intentionally created as technology undoubtedly is. The claim by Winner is that

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[77]Winner, L. P. 6.
[78]Winner, L. P. 6.
[79]Winner, L. P. 6.

technology goes beyond the notion and perceptions of making life better or easier. Technology presents alternatives. The making and use of technology requires choice regarding the kind of technology to be made and how that technology will be used. As he says:

> ...technologies are not merely aids to human activity, but also powerful forces acting to reshape that activity and its meaning.[80]

Another potential problem area for technology is exposed by Langdon Winner.[81] This is the connection between techne and politeia, or technological practice and politics. Aspects of control are inherent in technology or its application. Part of the conventional view seems to include a view of technological determinism similar to the contextual assumption that some make about sport. This view involves the perception that there is no alternative to what has happened, things are the only way they could be and because of that things as they are must be inherently good. The purpose of philosophy of technology is to identify and critically evaluate some of the major problems associated with the making and use of technology. Again, as Langdon Winner suggests:

> The basic task for a philosophy of technology is to examine critically the nature and significance of artificial aids to human activity. That is the appropriate domain of inquiry, one that sets it apart from, say, the philosophy of science.[82]

McKay has expressed concern for emphasis on procedures and practices of external agents in physical education over involvement of participants referring

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[80]Winner, L. P. 6.
[81]Winner, Langdon "Techne and Politiea," in The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1986.
[82]Winner, L. P. 5.

to this occurrence as "technocratic physical education."[83] These authors recognize that what is known and practiced in the movement domain is "socially constructed". There is intent involved in the practices of those who do them. The emphasis is on completion of particular technical procedures as the only way to either play the game or study it to the exclusion of exploratory and discovery alternatives. Where procedures may be thought to contribute to performance enhancement, the result is often unnecessary and inappropriate limitations on otherwise accepted values such as individual freedom. John Hoberman[84] goes further in expressing concern that such emphasis on science and technical procedures in sport may change human nature itself.

There are similarities between problems of technology and problems of sport. Neither technology nor sport have been major topics of philosophic inquiry primarily because it is assumed that the relation of each to human activity is obvious and, therefore, no inquiry is needed. The belief in progress is prevalent in both areas. The following discussion will focus on aspects of definition and practice.

Definition

Technology is commonly understood in terms of machines. However, there is an alternative view which defines technology as a process rather than as

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[83]McKay, Jim, Gore, Jennifer M. and Kirk, David "Beyond the Limits of Technocratic Physical Education," Quest, 42(1), April 1990, Pp. 52-76.
[84]Hoberman, John "Sport and the Technological Image of Man," in Morgan, W. and Meier, K.(Eds.) Philosophic Inquiry in Sport, Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1988, Pp. 319-327.

an artifact. In Chapter Two performance was defined as what one does, or what is done. Technology may be best understood as how things are done. When someone says "we have the technology" they mean to say that the means are available to accomplish some particular thing--that the knowledge, ability, and resources are available to get things done. The construction of machines as artifacts contribute to the process. As such they are part of the technology, the process, the means of getting things done.

Practice

Technology as practice defines the practitioners according to what they have in common in the way they do things. Ursuala Franklin elaborates on the notion of technology as practice.

> Looking at technology as practice indeed as formalized practice, has some quite interesting consequences. One is that it links technology directly to culture, because culture, after all, is a set of socially accepted practices and values. Well laid down and agreed upon practices also define the practitioners as a group of people who have something in common because of the way they are doing things.[85]

Major features of technology as practice are described by Franklin in terms of self-identification, expertise, and content. Self-identification involves a definition or classification of oneself in cultural terms because different cultures have different ways of doing the same thing. This is also described in terms of gender where particular activities or professions happen to be done primarily by

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[85]Franklin, U. The Real World of Technology, Toronto: CBC Enterprises, 1990, P. 15.

one gender such that aspects of gender, either maleness or femaleness, are taken to be a part of the activity itself. Common practice is also the basis of professions who have claimed exclusive rights to certain tools and technologies as the basis of practice. Technology defines content of what is done by excluding possibilities of doing things some other way. One example noted by Franklin in this regard is teaching.

> Teaching, for instance, is now a clearly circumscribed activity that takes place in a particular location and is conducted by particularly trained or ordained practitioners, and whatever somebody may teach you in working together with you, it isn't the kind of learning for which you ever get a credit.[86]

The approach to coaching suggested by Steele as 'guiding' seems to correspond to the idea of 'working together with you' noted by Franklin. The aspect of not getting any 'credit' for that kind of learning is as much prevalent in the technology of sport as in public education. Moreover, this applies to what coaches do as much as it applies to athletes, or participants which explains in part the problem in defining or claiming professional status for physical educators and sport professionals. Coaches and other movement teachers do not receive the same general respect as professional persons as do other occupations designated as professions such as medical doctors and lawyers.

There may be some question about whether sport is, in fact, a proper subject of the philosophy of technology. Technology has been defined as how things are done. To the extent that sport is concerned with technique, as in finding ways of getting things done, it is very much concerned with technology.

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[86]Franklin, U. P. 17.

Indeed, sport has been described as primarily concerned with technology.[87] This takes the form of strategies for performance enhancement which very often involve technological interventions.

8.3 Technology and Professional Practice

Technology Types

Ursula Franklin examines historical trends in the development of technology by identifying two major approaches to how something is done. Technologies have been either work-related or control-related. Work-related technologies are the kind which involve attempts to make work easier. Almost any kitchen appliance is a good example of this kind of work-related technology. Control-related technologies are not concerned with making work easier but emphasize establishing or increasing control of the operation of work. Work-related technology may become control-related by integration into a system. The example given by Franklin involves computers. One computer working alone constitutes a work-related technology but when linked to other computers it becomes part of a system that is control-related.

Franklin proposes two categories of technology types--holistic and prescriptive. The two technology types are distinguished by specialization and locus of control. Specialization can be in product or process. Locus of control can be with the performer or with the organizer.

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[87]Ellul, Jacques The Technological Society, New York: Vintage, 1964, P. 382-4.

Holistic technology is described by Franklin as associated with the notion of craft. The specialization involves major concern with a product. A major feature of holistic technology is that those who produce a product or service, the artisans, control the process of their own work from beginning to end. The locus of control lies with the one who produces the product and not with some external organizer. In this type of technology the actor specializes in the product. The process is holistic. Work is organized and completed entirely by the performer. Holistic technology is product specialized and performer controlled.

Prescriptive technology, on the other hand, is associated with the notion of production. The process of making or doing is broken down into clearly identifiable steps and each step is carried out by a separate worker or group. Knowledge required is limited to that which is needed to perform the specified task. In this type of technology the actor specializes. When work is organized as a sequence of separately executable steps, control shifts to the organizer. The process is prescribed. Work is orchestrated by the organizer but requires competence of performers. Individuals cannot 'do their own thing' and diverge from directives given by the organizer. Prescriptive technology is process specialized and organizer controlled.

Professional Objectives and Technology Types

Previously I described professional objectives as preventive, rehabilitative, and normative. A preventive objective is exemplified by the activities of a teacher. Persons engaged in this type of activity attempt to prevent the occurrence of

undesirable conditions such as injury and illness. A rehabilitative objective is exemplified by the activities of a physical therapist. Persons engaged in this type of activity attempt to correct undesirable conditions, to fix things which are 'broken'. A normative objective is exemplified by the activities of a sport coach. Persons engaged in this type of activity attempt to pursue specifically defined desirable conditions. This group works with otherwise normal people to make them better than they currently are in some way. In attempting to discover connections between professional objectives and technology types it is important to try to distinguish what appears as prevalent practice from any otherwise suggested alternative. First, an attempt to identify prevalent practice.

This comparison appears initially to be obvious. The characteristics of all noted professional objectives are consistent with the prescriptive type of technology described above. The primary actor, or performer, in these activities is the interventive agent. All professional objectives constitute an external locus of involvement. What makes this situation difficult is the recognition that, for the interventive agent, the technology is holistic. However, as the process is applied to the sport participant, it is prescriptive. The interventive agent is in control of the interventive process which qualifies that process as a holistic technology type. The athlete is not in control of the interventive process, so the interventive process, in itself, is a prescriptive technology type from the perspective of the participant. It is interesting to note that none of these interventive actions are directly a part of game actions. Interventive agents are not involved in sport performance itself.

Sport is essentially a holistic activity. Individual actions can be executed toward the game objective and integrated with the actions of other team members when required. Skills are executed very well in an apparent spontaneous and unexpected manner by players who have been playing together for a long time or they know each other so well that moves can be anticipated. This is not something that can be taught by an external agent, nor can it be achieved by pattern play. It is learned through the experience of participation and executed by the performers themselves. External agents, particularly coaches, are not directly involved in performance of skills during the game.

North American football is a good example of the division of labor in sport which characterizes the prescriptive technology. Wherever 'plays' are designed and planned before execution with separate tasks for each participant, a prescriptive technology is evident. All team sports may exhibit these properties to some extent. However, I suggest that this manner of participation is not a necessary one even in team sports.

Individual sports are more conducive to a holistic technology. But, even here we can readily discover the imposition of 'team' structure. This is not surprising given the noted historical emphasis of social order as an objective of sport organizers. The fewer the members on a team, the greater potential for individual diversity in performance execution, particularly when each member is engaged in essentially the same tasks. Basketball is a good example of this circumstance. Note the contrast between what is called 'pattern play' and 'free lance' styles of play. Pattern play is clearly an example of prescriptive technology.

'Free lance' is an example of the holistic type. This is more evident in contests involving fewer team members such as three on three or 'street ball'.

8.4 Images of Practice

Professional practice in the movement domain both begins and ends with an image of human nature. The beginning was noted in Chapter Five in terms of alternative images. The end is discussed in Chapter Nine as representation of images of excellence. In the middle is technology, as practice, which links the beginning image to the end representation. Some comment is required then, on the relation between technology and image. Discussion of this relation is informed by reference to the sequence of ideas and action introduced in Chapter Four on the professional perspective and subsequently discussed more fully in relation to knowledge and value in relevant chapters.

Technology and Image: The Idea-Action Sequence

Consistent with previously noted definition of technology as how things are done, I begin an exploration of the relation between technology and image with the assumption that technology precedes science. That is, humans have had ways of getting things done for some time which precedes the occurrence or establishment of a particular methodology for acquiring knowledge. This involves recognizing that process, as a goal-oriented activity, occurs prior to the working out of particular methodology for application, including discovering relevant knowledge. Determination of goal-orientation may be reasonably thought to be based on an idea, as a beginning, and a more fully developed image of what is

wanted, as goal-orientation. Thus, image provides the basis for technology. Image precedes technology. Current technology presents an image which represents something in terms of goal-orientation but that something is not clear. What does occur is perpetuation of an image which precedes the technology and which has not been clearly articulated, recognized, and accepted as such. Part of the knowledge problem is a lack of an articulated image as it applies to individual or collective goal-orientation. If scientific knowledge is not properly related to the preceding image, then clearly articulated goal-orientation is deficient and scientific knowledge would not be significantly related to an appropriate action response.

The dominant type of knowledge pursued in the study of sport is scientific. This is not, however, the case for the practice of sport. There is a useful distinction to be made between formal and informal knowledge in this regard. This distinction may also help locate philosophical knowledge as an important, yet lacking, aspect of formal knowledge. Whereas formally educated professionals in the sport domain may be said to have substantial scientific knowledge, the 'common' person involved in the same kind of professional roles emphasizes a different kind of knowledge acquired via the experience of participation and observation in the process described herein as the technology of image production. That is, with reference to coaching, people engage in coaching on the basis of perceived role expectations--the image precedes the practice. I would suggest that this can be perceived as philosophical knowledge, a type of knowledge often lacking in professionals. The 'common' person relies

more heavily on such knowledge than does the scientifically educated professional.

8.5 The Problem of Choice

The eighth choice is concerned with practice. One must decide the manner in which positions previously chosen will be implemented. This is essentially a question of technology. One may be involved in performance practice according to either a holistic or prescriptive technology. Holistic technology consists of a way of doing something which is oriented toward completion of an entire product or project the control of which lies with the individual involved in execution of the process and completion of the product or project. Prescriptive technology consists of a way of doing something which is oriented toward completion of a product or project the control of which lies with the individual involved in organizing the process for completion of the product or project.

The most significant influence as a problem of choice is who will be the agent of choice. This is understood by application of the work-related and control related aspects of technology. Attempts to make the work of sport easier have come primarily through the application of control as opposed to application of technology to the work itself. Contributions to the work itself may be seen in techniques of training which contribute to greater success. It is not clear, however, that these techniques can, in fact, make the work of sport any easier. The problem of technology as implementation of choices previously discussed in this study poses, in some sense, a cumulative problem of choice. The mere

presence of someone engaged in what is called professional practice actually creates the problem of who is to be the agent of choice.

There is still meaning for choice in the area of technology. Procedures may be modified to incorporate alternatives. The choice consists of holistic or prescriptive technology.

8.6 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to examine problems of philosophy of performance related to technology and the sport context drawing from literature on philosophy of technology and technology studies in general with emphasis on application of views of technology to the practice of performance enhancement. Problem areas discussed included techne and politeia, the culture of technology, technology types, and transformative practice as well as the relation between technological practice and image production. Two categories of technology types, prescriptive and holistic, as proposed by Ursula Franklin were related to professional practice by exploring previously identified professional objectives in terms of preventive, rehabilitative, and normative categories. The prescriptive type corresponds to normative objectives while the holistic type corresponds to both the preventive and rehabilitative objectives. The distinction which is made between forms of technology is most useful in examining sport as a practice which is also taken as the management and research model for related professional movement activities. The distinction is made between holistic and prescriptive forms of technology. Applying this

distinction to the above analysis effectively illustrates characteristics of a given practice in order to assess appropriateness of that practice to the activity to which it is applied. This distinction also illustrates the significance of the process-product relation in application of a particular type of technology in practice.

CHAPTER 9

THE PROBLEM OF EXCELLENCE: REPRESENTATION

9.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the problem of excellence in terms of how excellence is represented. A distinction is made between presentation and representation and some types of presentation are explored with implications for professional practice. The problem of representation is discussed in terms of image, excellence, exemplars, and basis of practice.

9.2 The Problem of Representation

Relation to Image

The problem of representation is closely related to the problem of images identified in metaphysical concerns by Bock, in knowledge concerns by Ross, and in value concerns by Gibson. The major difference between problems of image and problems of representation is one of intent. Representation involves an intentional portrayal of images. I am particularly interested in the representation of images of excellence in sport.

Richard Schechner writes:

> Play and art have long been treated as the dimmest shadows in Plato's cave--as "representations," "imitations," " expressions," and "versions" of some more authentic reality. But playing is a primary and irreducible way of living. [88]

One of the major problems of philosophic inquiry has been the distinction of

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[88]Schechner, Richard Ritual, Play, and Performance, New York: The Seabury Press, 1976, P. 45.

appearance from reality. The "representation theory of knowledge" maintains that information received by the senses forms an image in the mind which 'represents' the real object which, in turn, exists in the world external to the mind. What is perceived is an image, a 'representation' of the object, not the object itself. Even if one is not a Platonist, it is safe to say that one can never know things as they 'really' are. We can know images or representations. Recall that Chaney proposed studying human nature in terms of images which involved not asking questions about the 'real' nature of being. As he says:

> When we speak in terms of images, we aren't raising the deeply philosophical question of what human nature is as a thing-in-itself. With the concept of images we are moving away from questions of pure being toward questions about ourselves as thinking creatures. Instead of trying to say what the human really is, we are concerned with trying to say what the human thinks he or she is.[89]

I have argued that the dominant image in the human movement domain is portrayed via exemplars based on a negative image of human nature and supported by prescriptive objectives of professional practice.

Representation of Excellence

The call for pursuit of excellence in sport may be viewed as an attempt to justify, or rationalize, what is referred to by some as the mere 'playing of games'. Excellence in sport has been described conceptually in a number of different ways including achievement of a personal best, winning, and something which transcends winning and is undefinable.

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[89]Chaney, Norman Six Images of Human Nature, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1988, P. 5.

Achieving maximum performance is an individual notion of excellence which involves one person performing to the maximum of that person's capacity. Winning, on the other hand, is a more objective notion of excellence which involves doing some action better that another. Excellence as something beyond winning involves an ideal. The ideal depends upon those characteristics which are chosen for emphasis.[90] An ideal is an intellectual abstraction which reflects the value orientation of the one who devises it or uses it.[91] Those aspects of human existence which are chosen for emphasis, particularly in sport, portray an image of excellence which reflects the values of those involved.

It has been my contention that the pursuit of excellence in sport is not primarily a problem of values but rather a problem of epistemology. A better understanding of the constitutive nature of activities would effect the image of excellence represented. When it is understood that winning games cannot be accomplished without playing by the constitutive rules of the game, it is also understood that the declared winner of a game cannot be a representative of excellence if this person has not played by the rules.

Each individual has different characteristics, abilities, and potentials. Each person may pursue excellence in different ways. A broader conception of human excellence must account for these individual differences. Yet, sport focuses on performance of particular kinds of physical skills. The emphasis is on biological aspects of performance.

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[90]Landis, Bernard and Tauber, Edward S. (Eds.), In the Name of Life, Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971, p. 180.
[91]Landis and Tauber, p. 180.

> It is important to emphasize here that the various types of sport simulate in practice all the many different characteristics of the work demanded of physiological systems for every kind of mental and physical activity performed by model man.[92]

This position is consistent with Chaney's 'original' image category which contends that biology is not only the basis for human existence, biology defines the limits of human potential. It is a reductionist view which implies that individuals can do no more than their biological makeup will allow. Sport in its various forms is thought to be representative of what may be achieved within those biological limits. The assumption is that one can develop his or her own unique characteristics of 'self' only by maximizing biological capacities.

The problem with this is that there are other aspects to human existence--including cultural and autonomous aspects. Emphasis on biological capacities cannot sufficiently account for either of these, especially the autonomous aspect. The following comment on excellence is informative here.

> Definitions of excellence tend to be most narrow at the point where we are selecting individuals, or testing them, or training them. In the course of daily life, mature people recognize many varieties of excellence in one another. But when we are selecting, testing or training we arbitrarily narrow the range. The reasons for doing so are practical ones. Narrowing the grounds for selection is one way of making the selection process manageable. To the extent that we admit a great variety of kinds of excellence we make the task of testing virtually impossible.[93]

Sport, as an elitist activity, operates as a selective practice. The definition of excellence is narrowed to accommodate that practice. Although almost anyone

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[92]Kuznetsov, V.V. "The Potentialities of Man and Anthropomaximology," International Social Science Journal, 34(2), 1982, P. 282.

[93]Gardner, John Excellence: Can We Be Equal and Excellent Too?, New York: Harper & Row, 1971(c1961).

may participate in some kind of sport according to their own abilities, not everyone can be good at it. If sport performance is taken to represent the ultimate in human potential, a consequence is that not everyone can be excellent nor can everyone be represented.

Excellence cannot be limited to selected individuals. When it is recognized that there are a variety of types of excellence possible, excellence ceases to be elitist. Limitations on excellence are artificial constructs. Sport portrays a prescriptive notion of excellence. Sport is elitist but excellence is not. What counts as the content of excellence in practice, then, is a matter of choice.

Representation of Exemplars

The most commonly referred to exemplars in human endeavors are those involved in creative rather than technical activities. For example, in art we hear about Leonardo da Vinci, in literature we hear about Shakespeare, and in music we hear about Mozart. Although specialists will be aware of the most prominent people in a given field of endeavor, almost everyone will have some knowledge of these people and their accomplishments. Technical activities which may be 'performed to perfection' according to some known principles, while commendable accomplishments, do not serve to provide exemplars for all the truly human aspects of human existence.

Following an elitist system, exemplars are thought to represent the ideal which the remainder of the population should attempt to emulate in some way. However, the existence of the elitist system, in itself, precludes the possibility of

everyone attaining that kind of excellence which is exemplified.

Basis of Practice

The problem of representation in sport may be broached by noting again Schechner's reference to play as a real, actual way of being, or acting, as active involvement in the world, rather than a mere representation of some more "authentic reality". To the extent that sport can be said to have any basis in play, it too is involved in a problem of reality-representation distinction.

Sport, as an intentional endeavor, involves intentional presentation of an image of reality which includes or is based on an intentionally created image of human nature because certain characteristics are chosen for emphasis. This image provides the basis, in terms of model, for professional practice and, some might argue, comprises a major objective of professional practice. Because there is no factual basis for the image portrayed, certain identifiable characteristics are chosen for emphasis. Subsequently, the image represented is a matter of choice.

9.3 Representation and Sport Performance

Representational Sport

Paul Weiss used representation in describing an athlete's progress toward self-completion.

> Finally, there is his assumption of the position of a representative in a game, where, without losing distinctiveness, he functions on behalf of, and so far exhibits the import of, others.[94]

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[94]Weiss, P. P. 36.

Although Weiss describes a self-actualization view, the notion of representation he provides portrays the intent and concerns of others. Weiss's representative assumes the position, or role, which is given by others. This is clearly an external determination of action. By this view, one may begin participation in sport for individual reasons and benefits, but eventually does so, unavoidably it seems, for the benefit of others. Interestingly, this seems to be very much like an archaic notion of 'champion' as a representative. In any case, there is a question of what is being represented and in what way that occurs. The same orientation to representation is expressed more recently by Gibson who tells us that:

> A representational sport is one in which the athlete realizes he represents his town, state or country, and the spectators feel that the athlete is representing them against another group.[95]

This expresses the notion that representational sport is a political orientation. This is a popular, common view, similar to the 'champion' idea and perpetuates external determination of action according to social role. Part of the misunderstanding in this view is derived from an external orientation and direction toward opponents. The audience may feel that the athlete represents them but this does not necessarily have to be in relation to another group. That is, the athlete may provide an existential representation of human nature to which another can relate. Directing actions toward an opponent is not a necessary part of that empathetic process. Personal representation is embodied within the performance of athletes as a public presentation.

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[95]Gibson, J. P. 37.

The suggestion that spectators are necessary for sport is a curious and interesting claim. Some might suggest that there is no point to sport performance if there is nobody there to see it. The implication that an audience of some kind is important to sport requires some attention. The relation between the performer and the audience is explored through the notion of representation as presentation which I discuss below.

Performer, Self, and Act

I want to interpret sport performance in terms of representation as presentation such that what is represented through performance is understood to be intentionally presented. This involves interpretation and communication with an audience. Although representation may occur inherently in many kinds of performance, intentional presentation seems to be of special concern to certain kinds of performance. Sport performance is one of these kinds of performance along with, for example, theatrical and musical performances.

There are some major components to be addressed in the process of intentional presentation which include the performer, the audience, and the act itself. Consideration must also be given to external agents as additional components of performance in the context of professional practice. The actor, the one who actually does the performance, must relate to the other three in some way.

Communication

The notion of performance as communication, which is drawn from the work of Julian Hilton,[96] understands performance to involve transference of information, primarily through an exemplar.[97] The representation of the information consists of a synthesis of interpreted experience. The act, or performance, is a holistic representation which embodies that synthesis of meaning. I take this to mean that an actor engaging in performance is telling us, the audience, 'this is what it's like to live in this world'. A representation of this interpretation is communicated by the act of intentional presentation.

Performer, Audience, and Act

Presentation

Performance as presentation, as described by Bernard Beckerman,[98] is based on the notion of giving. The common elemental structure of performances of this type includes: a donor--the performer; a receiver--the audience; a gift--the act performed; and an environment--the physical context. According to this view, the act is given or displayed for view as a transformative act in which the audience may participate. That which is given, then, is an opportunity to participate in an event intended and constructed to facilitate transcendence and transformance of the viewer's particular circumstance. Performance as presentation, then, is a transformative practice.

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[96]Hilton, Julian Performance, London: Macmillan, 1990.
[97]Hilton, J. P. 32.
[98]Beckerman, Bernard Theatrical Presentation, New York: Routledge, 1990.

Iconic Presentation

A sport performance is a presentation when it is done with the intent of being observed by an audience. It is done, in a sense, for the audience.

The performer as an icon represents, in the case of sport, an illustration of mastery of being through physical skill. An important aspect of illustration is that the audience can also do what the performer has done. Illustration applies to others besides the performer and, in the case of sport, may apply to execution of non-skill game activities as well as physical skills. Illustration might occur simply in correct and successful execution of basic movement and skills such as those which frequently occur during pre-game warm-up. This is an illustration of how to do these skills well. This illustration may be carried into the game in terms of how to do these things well against an opponent. Related to non-game skills, one might illustrate such things as 'character' in the face of adversity or 'sportsmanship'. Because of illustration depends upon an audience being able to replicate what is represented, the illustrative aspect of performance as presentation may apply more to the non-game related aspects of sport more than to game skills.

Iconic presentation may also take the form of demonstration. Sport performance is a demonstration of power through physical skills. Demonstration is an execution of the performer's ability or characteristics which do not necessarily apply to the audience. That is, athletes may be able to perform skills that the audience cannot. The performance of a 'slam dunk' on the basketball court is an example of demonstration because most people in the audience cannot

do it. Demonstration of the performer's ability may be observed in execution of more complex skills or execution against more competent and able opponents. Demonstration could also apply to non-game related aspects of sport as a demonstration of the athlete's ability to act in a particular manner. At one time walking away from a fight might have been considered an appropriate demonstration of an athlete's ability of control.

Dialectic Presentation

Performers engage in activity over which they do not have total control. Less control includes greater risk and uncertainty of outcome. The focus of performers is on pursuing objectives. Performers focus on the completion of particular tasks rather than on an audience.

> The substance of dialectic performance is to answer the question as to who wins and more important, show what the characters go through as they struggle to win.[99]

Dialectic presentation emphasizes process over outcome. Serious fans know the difference between knowing the score of a game that *has been played* and watching that same game *as it is being played*. The value of the performance for the spectator is derived from the empathetic relation between the athlete and the observer which is established during the game.

Observe a group of young people involved in a game of 'tag'. These people know that what they are doing is not important in the same way that working to buy food is important. They do, however, understand that what is

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[99]Beckerman, B. P. 61.

important about the game is treating the outcome 'as if' it does make a difference. The outcome is not as important as the process.

The usual understanding of resistance in dialectic is that of opposition. There are other factors to consider, however, as resistance to performance; other factors which may interfere with the performance or prevent its completion. In sport performance, resistance may be found internal to the performer, external to the performer, and in the act itself . Internal resistance is usually understood in terms of psychological factors such as self-confidence. External resistance refers to opponents, environment, or equipment. Resistance to the act are skill components such as balance, force, speed, timing, or trajectory.

Overcoming resistance produces change, or transformation, of some kind. Three aspects of transformation include the locus of change, the agent of change, and the type of change. Similar to resistance forces in dialectic, the locus of change may be found primarily in the performer, the audience, or the act itself. The agent of change may also be found in one these three alternatives.

Whereas transformation in theatrical presentation is fictional because scripted, this is not generally the case in sport, although a pre-arranged 'game plan' might be considered an attempt to do this. Or, for example, figure skating as an example of iconic presentation involves a more scripted approach. In the theatrical presentation,

> [w]hat is essential...is that the actor go through a hypothetical action involving some aspect of transformation; narrative, emotive, rational.[100]

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[100]Beckerman, B. P. 64.

Sport performance is not a hypothetical action nor can much of it be scripted, especially those activities which are primarily dialectic. The greater the number of forces of resistance, the greater the requirement for creative response. One might reasonably argue that sport is the kind of activity which should not be scripted, especially if it is derived from play.

> However much we try to find the source of shows in social or cultural conditions, the creative action is a product of free choice. The very fact that there is no absolute need to walk a tightrope, juggle a ball, play a part, or pull a rabbit out of a hat liberates these acts from mere necessity. That is why they so excellently express the free play of the human spirit.[101]

Claims that external agents are necessary for play constitute a degradation of 'the free play of the human spirit'. This perspective seems to correspond with what Bock referred to as:

> the charge of human impotence that is the ultimate affront to human dignity.[102]

If changes are to be effected through professional practice, which seems to be a major part of professional objectives, then greater attention needs to be given to transformation as it occurs in relation to sport performance. That is, if we, as professionals are going to act as interventive agents, we should pay attention to the nature of changes and the way we make those changes to ensure that professional activities are both appropriate and justifiable. A better understanding of the philosophical choices involved may contribute to more appropriate and justifiable practice. This is even more important when we

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[101]Beckerman, B. P. 19.
[102]Bock, K. P. 7.

recognize that such involvement also is part of the representative aspect of sport performance.

Peripheral Agents

Assistants

Persons not involved directly in performance actions but who are involved in some support capacity, such as a coach, physical therapist, or psychologist, are more properly referred to as assistants. Assistants are also representatives of performance. Their involvement in presentation is effected by their mere presence. Simply by being there assistants are representative of excellence.

Since assistants are not primarily involved in game actions anyway, their role in representation cannot consist in the representation of skill execution. Sport professionals claiming particular expertise, special knowledge, or an otherwise unique contribution to performance, should be able to represent this information to others. This includes a more comprehensive approach to pursuit of performance objectives. It is my position that the potential contribution of assistants must be made more clear. These contributions may be informed by the objectives noted in Chapter One for professionals in terms of demonstrative and facilitative contributions. The greatest potential for contribution lies in the facilitative contribution. Assistants can do much to facilitate the acquisition of required skills by the performer. Consistent with the thesis of this study, the facilitative contribution includes removal or reduction of influences of an

external nature which are contrary to the pursuit of mastery.

Externals

In discussion of the notion of theatrical presentation, Beckerman referred to the relations which occur during the performance between the performer and other aspects of the performance context including the audience, the act itself, and the performer as self. I have added commentary on others involved more directly yet in support capacity as assistants. Increasingly, there appears to be another category of agents not involved directly in the performance and which are further removed than those called assistants. These agents I call externals because they are, in fact, entirely external to the performance. They make no contribution to the performance itself, nor do they act in any support capacity during the performance or rehearsals. Yet, they do have some influence on the conduct and organization of the performance. As such, these agents may also influence the nature of the presentation and that which is represented. In this way, external agents also contribute to the image of excellence which is portrayed through sport performance. The most notable examples of externals are corporations which manufacture and promote sports equipment or otherwise advertise through or during the sport performance. Television media personnel mediate the image of performance received by viewers. Consequently, they directly influence the nature of the representation as an image of excellence.

9.4 Images of Excellence

Iconic Image

In Weiss's terms, there comes a time in the sequential development of athletic excellence when one's level of mastery is demonstrated primarily for the benefit of others, not oneself. The N.B.A. player, Charles Barkley's claim not to be a role model constitutes a rejection of this view. This kind of rejection seems reasonable given the claim that sport performance is to be understood as personal mastery of skill. However, complete rejection may not be reasonable if mastery involves all three major aspects of human nature identified according to Chaney's categories as biological, cultural, and autonomous.

Demonstration of physical skill and emphasis on winning cannot account for all of aspects of human existence. The image portrayed is incomplete. The iconic image predominantly presented by contemporary sport is a skewed notion of mastery due to the focus on winning or an image based on demonstration of physical skill.

Dialectic Image

In Gibson's terms, winning has value as it perpetuates advantage and benefit to those who win while losing has no value as those who lose are eliminated from the process of acquiring advantage and benefit. A system which emphasizes elimination cannot sufficiently account for synthesis. It is based on a closed image of human nature. That is, dialectic in a closed system based on a closed image consists of negation without synthesis, elimination of the

opposition.

According to the notion of dialectic, the result of action is important, but it cannot be separated from the process because the process produces the result. Without the process there is no result. The result may be seen as a representation of the process. If one criticizes the result, one must also criticize the process which produced it. Process cannot be valued over the product nor vice versa. Each may be misunderstood or misinterpreted but they cannot be overvalued. If one aspect is thought to be problematic, then the other is also problematic in some way.

Criticisms of the process are not so frequent as criticisms aimed at a an overemphasis on results. Because attention is primarily given to the result by both proponents and critics of sport, the dialectic image of sport is incomplete because of lack of attention, either favourably or critically, to the process.

9.5 The Problem of Choice

The ninth choice is concerned with excellence. The most significant problem of choice for representation is that of agency. The performer is the most important representative as an agent of action. If there is anything necessary about performance, it is the existence or presence of a performer. To the extent that assistants are taken to be necessary, integrally involved, and publicly visible, they too are representative of performance as agents of action. Further, where transformational intent is involved the major concern is that of what is to be changed, in what way, and by whom.

The problem of agency is reinforced by claims that external agents of various kinds are necessary. The problem is who makes the choice about the nature of performance representation. The choice involves the nature of the image of excellence which is presented, or represented, through sport participation. Ideas about excellence are embodied in the image portrayed, or presented during performance by all those involved. The significant choice in this regard is either iconic presentation or dialectic presentation.

9.6 Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter has been to explore the problem of excellence as representation. Problems of representation have been discussed in terms of image, excellence, exemplars, and practice. I have been concerned about the image of excellence represented through the presentation of sport performance. Discussion was informed by literature on the topic of theatrical presentation by Bernard Beckerman in which he distinguishes various types of presentation. Implications for professional practice were drawn from descriptions of iconic presentation and dialectic presentation. The predominant iconic presentation in sport was said to consist of a skewed notion of mastery which emphasizes demonstration of physical skill by the athlete and de-emphasizes a more complete mastery of being. The predominant dialectic presentation in sport was said to consist of a skewed notion of synthesis through the dialectic process. Emphasis on opposing forces rather than resistant forces results in a presentation of negation rather than synthesis. Demonstration of physical skill and negation

constitutes a presentation of outcome rather than process. This is contrary to an understanding of the inseparability of process from the outcome. Given the prevalence of external agents involved in presentation of sport performance, the problem of choice is understood in terms of who is to have agency.

CHAPTER 10

THE PROBLEM OF PROBLEMS: PERSISTENCE

10.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize relevant discussion points of this study and derive implications and suggestions for future study of the philosophy of sport performance and human movement. The nature of philosophical problems is discussed with reference to two types of problems--those that are historical and those that are persistent. The major concern here is the ongoing nature of problems and a corresponding need for ongoing analysis of those problems. Four specific areas are identified for particular attention in future study which correspond to major taxonomic areas of subject matter including: a)language, b)cognitive aspects of emotion, c)the political microcosm of sport, and d)the idea of self as a persistent problem. A final comment is offered with reference to the claim that life is a game.

10.2 The Problem of Persistence

It is useful to note different types of problems which one may encounter. We can identify two general types of problems which may described as either historical or persistent. Historical problems are those which arise at particular periods of historical time. These problems may be identified as such only for that time. Persistent problems are those which do not come and go but rather are with us all the time. These appear to have no solution and, subsequently, may be

the source of much frustration in analysis. Such categorization of problems may help in assessment of both relevance and significance during analysis procedures. The problem of persistence lies in recognizing that there are some problems which will not go away and which also require a choice; an ongoing, persistent choice. In fact, Earle Zeigler implies that all philosophical problems are persistent problems.[103] As Gorovitz and Williams write:

> The problems of philosophy have not changed as much as, for instance, those of science, therefore, attention to past writings is not peripheral to contemporary philosophy, as it often is to contemporary science.[104]

There is criticism of the failure of philosophy to solve persistent problems which have been talked and written about for centuries. In my view, emphasizing history of ideas does not do justice to potential and needed application of the philosophical enterprise to historical problems which are contemporary to our own time. In recent years, scientific problems have been emphasized in the discipline of physical education and sport. Subsequently, philosophic inquiry has come to be thought of as peripheral to the discipline--a matter of historical interest if at all. Although the scientific knowledge base in empirical terms may have increased, articulation of both descriptive and normative aspects of the philosophical foundations of professional practice appears to have severely stagnated. Ideas from past historical context still guide the actions of persons in

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[103]Zeigler, Earle F. Problems in the History and Philosophy of Physical Activity and Sport, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
[104]Gorovitz, S. and Williams, R.G. Philosophical Analysis: An Introduction to Its Language & Techniques, 2nd Edition, New York: Random House, 1969, P. 155.

their professional roles. This suggests that philosophical problems have been solved, in some way, regarding at least the major activities of professional practice for the domain of human movement, especially competitive sport. The problem of persistence then, is compounded by unquestioned acceptance of solutions for both study and practice which may not be appropriate nor even the best available.

The history of sport performance has provided us with a current basis of practice which many consider as tradition. Contemporary concerns include increasing awareness of ethical issues, technology and appropriate limits to human striving, and the definition of excellence. The future of sport performance based on these aspects and problems derived therefrom is very uncertain. Problems tend not to decrease with complexity but rather to increase. One might speculate on the increasing potential for problems in sport performance and in the area of performance generally in what has been referred to as the physical activity professional domain.

10.3 The Problem of Choice

There is a tenth choice in the current attempt at construction of the basis for a philosophy of sport performance which concerns the relation between the nature of problems and choice itself. The most significant problem of choice here is that of unanswerable questions. The common perception that philosophy consists of unanswerable questions inhibits the understanding that those questions are, in fact, answered by choice and further impedes examination of alternatives to find the best answer.

New information and understanding may improve choices for persistent problems. The nature of choice is continual, or persistent. In order for this to occur in practice one has to be open to receiving and integrating new information and understanding through philosophical reflection. Historical problems require attention to new information and understanding simply because they occur in unique periods of historical time. Old answers are not sufficient for new problems. It may be usual for individuals to formulate an opinion on major philosophical questions at some point in life and then proceed to live by those opinions without modification whatever the circumstances. Those who do this act according to opinions which are static, or historical, according to the definitions previously given.. Such people are closed to new insights and improved or informed choices. The significant aspect of choice in this regard is whether one's choices about the given questions are taken to be either closed or open. The choice is that of making one's choices, consistent with the nature of problems, historical or persistent.

10.4 Project Summary

The general purpose of this project has been to address the philosophical study of sport via what I have referred to as a performance perspective. Procedural objectives included identification, description, and evaluation of philosophical foundations for practice in the sport context with implications for other professional movement practices as informed by selected interdisciplinary literature from the areas of sport, philosophy, technology studies, and theatre.

More specifically, I have attempted to illustrate the manner by which problems of practice are derived from philosophical problems. By examining some basic problem areas, I have tried to demonstrate the contribution philosophical inquiry can make to informing, and perhaps, correcting philosophical mistakes, in terms of choices, which contribute to those problems.

I have attempted to show the manner in which contemporary problems in sport are knowledge problems rather than frequently claimed value problems. Problems of practice are based on faulty philosophical choices, inappropriate influence on those choices, and misunderstandings about the nature of sport itself.

Philosophical problems are initially derived from the four major taxonomic categories of philosophic inquiry including being, knowledge, values, and logic. Additional problems of particular concern to the professional domain have been identified and analyzed through the process of asking basic questions of inquiry including what, why, and how as they apply to sport performance. Three kinds of problems corresponding to those questions are addressed as problems of concept, practice, and purpose. The problem of concept is primarily addressed as definition of activities according to either descriptive or intentional meaning for those involved. The problem of practice is primarily addressed as technology contrasting focus on work or control aspects of involvement. The problem of purpose is primarily addressed as winning in which results are said to be emphasized over the process of participation due to misunderstanding of the nature of the activities themselves. It is important to note, however, that the

problems of concept, practice, and purpose are not only relevant but substantively related to each of the other problem addressed in other separate chapters. That is, problem types are not strictly mutually exclusive.

Influence on philosophical choices is primarily derived from what is called the 'common' problem which also served to distinguish a common from professional orientation to professional practice. Professional practice as action is based on an image of human nature which is eventually expressed through sport performance as an image of excellence. Incomplete images of excellence are predominantly portrayed through skewed notions of sport performance as both iconic and dialectic presentations.

10.5 Future Study

Although each of the topical areas included in this study deserve ongoing attention, four specific areas are identified for particular attention in future study which correspond to major taxonomic areas of subject matter including: a)language, b)cognitive aspects of emotion, c)the political microcosm of sport, and d)the idea of self as a persistent problem.

In the area of logic, the aspect of language requires further and ongoing attention to clarify basic concepts which provide foundations for professional practice. Even evolving concepts such as performance and excellence require ongoing attention as persistent philosophical problems.

In the area of being, ideas of 'self' requires attention as an ongoing, or persistent, philosophical problem to ensure a place and proper attention as part

of the professional project.

In the area of knowledge, cognitive aspects of emotion require attention to expand appropriate epistemological considerations and enhance professional credibility for the professional domain. This is particularly relevant for what are frequently recognized as emotive activities. Sport may be thought of as the 'common' expression of structure for feeling, thought, and action--the connection of ideas to action. The structure may combine feeling as emotion, thought as decision-making, and action as goal-oriented movement. Exploration of the relation between ideas and action as influenced by feeling in sport is a recommended area of future study.

10.6 Concluding Statement

Some might claim that sport is a training ground for life based on the notion that life is a game. Perhaps life is a game, or could be. However, I would suggest that this does not preclude examining either sport or life as intentional activities.

Sport is a normative context and regulatory agents within it embody, in their actions, normative objectives. Although sport may be used for a variety of purposes, professional practitioners should share some common goals. Professional practice should consist of a cooperative community, not a divisive one, with a common goal. This common goal has been expressed by Robert L.

Simon[105] as "the mutual quest for excellence". What counts as excellence should not be assumed. As a concept and in exemplification excellence must be articulated and justified as far as we are able. The dialectic should incorporate synthesis, not negation. If the pursuit of excellence is to be a part of professional objectives, then those who participate, regulate, and thus exemplify the best we have to offer in the way of developing human potential must, and I use the word 'must' intentionally, base their actions and practices on positive ideas about human action and involvement in this world. Representations of human action portrayed through exemplars should be based on what has been referred to as an open image of human nature and on positive practice.

Sport as an extension of play, is the kind of activity which incorporates, by the very characteristics of human involvement in it, a great degree of flexibility in potential construct and execution. As such, it may serve any purpose we require of it. Perhaps this is one of the great ongoing attractions of sport, especially in view of the common-professional problem and claims that sport expresses a 'public' philosophy.

Recent consumer ads would have us believe that life is a sport. The implication is that sport and life are understandable in common terms. It is my contention that professional philosophy and professionals in the 'mutual pursuit of excellence' should be leading in articulation, expression, and exemplification of the development of human potential, not only in sport but in other areas of

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[105]Simon, Robert L. Sports and Social Values, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985.

human performance. This can only be properly accomplished by specific attention to philosophical problems and foundations of professional practice, ongoing evaluation of those positions and practices, and informing those positions by reference to other performance professions, disciplines, and practices.

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